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I. INTRODUCTION
The problems encountered by drawers of postdated checks (PDCs)
are exemplified in the recent experiences of a law professor/colleague
of mine. She recounted the following story involving PDCs and a day-
care center which provided services to two of the professor's children.
The daycare center required payment of tuition for a full year in ad-
vance. In order to accommodate the professor, the daycare center ac-
cepted nine personal checks, each constituting one-ninth of the total
tuition, one payable each month for nine months. This arrangement
worked well for the first four months. In the fifth month, the daycare
center deposited checks five through nine. The checks were honored by
the professor's bank and depletion of the account caused a number of
other checks to be dishonored. The daycare center claimed inadvertent
error, but refused to refund the money. The bank supported its refusal
to credit the account for the amount of the prematurely paid PDCs by
asserting the rights of the daycare center. The bank claimed that pay-
ment of the checks satisfied a legitimate obligation of the professor to
the daycare center so the professor had suffered no loss.1 The profes-
sor's budget was left in a shambles, and the professor found little solace
in the potential claim for breach of contract against the daycare center
or for wrongful dishonor against the bank.2 The law professor, like
many consumers, chose not to absorb the time and expense of litiga-
tion, even though she may have been entitled to have her account
recredited and to damages caused by the wrongfully dishonored
1. The bank's argument was based upon U.C.C. § 4-407, which gave the bank the right to
subrogate to the rights of the daycare center. See infra notes 40-61 for discussion of U.C.C. § 4-
407 subrogation rights. However, the professor and the daycare center had a payment agreement
which provided for monthly installments. The payments represented by checks six through nine
were not yet due pursuant to the terms of that agreement. Therefore, the bank would have been
subrogated to rights that were not yet due and would not have had a valid defense against the
professor's claim of improper payment under U.C.C. § 4-401.
2. U.C.C. § 4-402(b) provides:
A payor bank is liable to its customers for damages proximately caused by the wrongful
dishonor of an item. When the dishonor occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual dam-
ages proved. If so proximately caused and proved damages may include damages for an arrest or
prosecution of the customer or other consequential damages. Whether any consequential damages




checks.3 Things could have been worse for the professor. If one of the
payees of the dishonored checks had filed a complaint with the appro-
priate law enforcement agency, the professor could have been arrested
and charged with a crime." The frustrating experiences of this col-
league reflect those of many drawers of PDCs.
PDCs have presented a host of problems for consumers, bankers,
and lawyers that seem to defy judicial resolution.5 The same questions
have been presented repeatedly, and the courts have not provided a
consistent analysis of the issues presented.6 Some of the problems have
been definitional. Is a PDC a check?7 Is it a negotiable instrument?5
Other problems have been practical. Do PDCs constitute consideration
for contract purposes? Are payor banks9 liable when PDCs are paid
3. U.C.C. § 4-402.
4. Drawing a check when there are insufficient funds in the drawee's account to cover it is
an offense included in the criminal codes of each state. See infra notes I 111-21, for discussion of
the criminal law problem.
5. American Agric. Chem. Co. v. Scrimger, 100 A. 774 (Md. 1917) (postdated checks are
legal instruments); Briand v. Wild, 268 A.2d 896 (N.H. 1970) (negotiability of a check not af-
fected by postdating); Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Haywvorth, 296 F. 339 (4th Cir. 1924) (a
postdated check need not be presented on its date); Kuflik v. Vaccaro, 170 N.Y.S. 13 (1918) (a
postdated check is a negotiable instrument); Matathias v. Bel-Mar Lab., Inc., 222 N.E.2d 736
(N.Y. 1966) (postdated checks are merely promissory notes); Allied Color Corp. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 484 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a postdated check is not a check but a
draft); Stag Co. v. Union Bank, 201 Ill. App. 510 (1922) (bank paying postdated check prior to
its due date is liable to drawer); Wilson v. Mid-West State Bank, 186 N.W. 891 (Iowa 1922) (a
certified check postdated three weeks contains notice of defect upon its face; a purchaser before
maturity is not a holder in due course).
6. For example, in Kuflik v. Vaccaro, 170 N.Y.S. 13 (1918), and Matathias v. Bel-Mar
Lab., Inc., 222 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1966), decided years later, the courts upheld the validity of
postdated checks. However, in Kuflik they were described generally as negotiable instruments,
while in Matathias postdated checks were characterized as promissory notes. In these cases the
difference in characterization did not affect the outcome; however, such distinctions sometimes
confuse the bench and bar. This may account for why issues surrounding postdated checks which
should be noncontroversial after a number of decisions keep coming up in appeals.
7. This question was raised as recently as 1978 in Australia where the court stated that a
postdated cheque is not a cheque within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act. Brien v.
Dwyer, 141 C.L.R. 378 (Austl. 1978). The Australian Bills of Exchange Act is patterned after
the English act bearing the same name. The United States Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.)
and its successor the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) were patterned after England's Bills of
Exchange Act.
8. This issue was debated by the courts after the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments
Law despite the fact that prior to the passage of that act the negotiability of postdated checks was
firmly established in case law. See Kuflik v. Vaccaro, 170 N.Y. S. 13 (1918); First Nat'l Bank of
Trinity, Tex. v. McKay, 521 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (a check is a negotiable instru-
ment in spite of its having been postdated).
9. U.C.C. § 4-105(3) defines payor bank as the bank that is the drawee of a draft. Although
not specifically defined in the U.C.C., the drawer is the person who writes the check, and the
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before the stated date? If the banks are liable, what is the measure of
damages? Is a bank required to honor a PDC at all? These are just a
sampling of the perplexing questions that arise in connection with
PDCs. Unfortunately courts and commentators have been unable to re-
solve the confusion and uncertainty that surround PDCs, which leaves
consumers, like the law professor in the example above, in a quandry.
In addition to, or perhaps as a result of the legal issues surround-
ing the use of PDCs, there is widespread disagreement concerning
whether PDCs have legitimate commercial uses. Barkley Clark said the
use of PDCs has a slightly unsavory aroma.' 0 On the other hand, some
courts have described PDCs quite favorably." This disparity between
court and commentator is fairly reflective of the ambivalence with
which PDCs are received within the legal profession. The simple truth
is that PDCs are usually a poor substitute for some other negotiable
instrument that provides better protection for the interests of the par-
ties involved. The law professor could have paid the daycare center
with a promissory note calling for monthly installment payments. The
daycare center could have discounted the note and received cash imme-
diately for the value of the note. Instead, the PDCs were used to facili-
tate the short-term extension of credit'" to the exclusion of more tradi-
tional devices's which are available to achieve the desired objective,
postponement of payment. If a promissory note of credit agreement is
payee is the person to whom the check is written. See WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 22-23 (1988).
10. BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS (3d
ed. 1990).
11. People v. Gerber, 453 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1982) (New York courts have a longstanding
policy of encouraging the use of postdated checks in the commercial world); Mohawk Bank v.
Broderik, 13 Wend. 133, 135 (N.Y. 1834) (drawing of postdated checks is an everyday occurrence
in our commercial cities); Clarke Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Albion, 52 Barb. Ch. 592, 600 (N.Y.
1868) (postdated checks are instruments often used and their nature and character well under-
stood by bankers and the trading community). See also Bowen v. Newell, 8 N.Y. 190, 195
(1853).
12. See, e.g., Andrew & Wilson v. Blachly, 11 Ohio St. 89, 91 (1860) ("These postdated
checks are evidently but another mode of attaining the same end which was sought to be attained
in the use of the instrument sued on in this case, viz: the postponement of the day of payment
Problems have arisen when PDCs have been used without the consent of the creditor to make
installment payments pursuant to credit arrangements. See Lake Village Implement Co. v. Cox,
249 Ark. 733, 461 S.W.2d 108 (1970); Vermeer Sales & Serv. v. Elec. Sales & Serv., 385 So. 2d
305 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Phil-Co Feeds v. First Nat'l Bank in Havre, 777 P.2d 1306 (Mont.
1989).
13. The list of alternative methods of deferring payment, in addition to promissory notes,
includes credit cards and credit agreements.
[Vol. 14:37
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used, provisions for default, confession of judgment, interest, payment
of attorney's fees, etc., can be included. Since a PDC contains only an
order to pay a specified amount on the stated date, the instrument pro-
vides little assistance to the attorney or the court in the attempt to sort
out the rights and obligations of the parties. Given such inadequacies,
one would suspect that the use of PDCs would be limited to fairly un-
substantial transactions between parties lacking business acumen. Sur-
prisingly, that has not been the case. In fact, the sophistication of the
parties in the reported cases involving PDCs suggests that PDCs are a
respected commercial instrument, widely accepted and commonly
utilized.
14
Undoubtedly, PDCs are most frequently used in a number of un-
documented transactions that do not involve attorneys, come fair
weather or foul. The local daycare center or private school may accept
PDCs as installment payments for tuition. The small retailer may ac-
cept PDCs as payment for goods or services. A good neighbor, friend,
or acquaintance may be willing to accept a PDC in exchange for goods
or services or as payment for a personal loan."8 Bill collectors"6 have a
14. Starboard Tack Corp. v. Meister, 303 N.W.2d 38 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (PDCs used to
make payments into an escrow account); Pace v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 347 S.E.2d 724 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986) (PDC used by liquor retailer to pay account).
In Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977), the bank had the debtor
tender several PDCs as installment payments to accompany a promissory note. The transaction
was quite sophisticated as evidenced by the fact that the face amount of the PDCs included inter-
est payments calculated from the transaction's consummation.
In Overton v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 444 (R.I. 1970) and Brand v. Interna-
tional Investors, 521 P.2d 423 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974), insurance companies used PDCs as part of a
payment plan for their customers. The customers issued twelve PDCs as installment payments for
the annual policy premium. The insurance companies deposited the checks as they matured. Both
parties derived some benefit from the use of PDCs in these transactions. The bank and the insur-
ance companies did not have to send out bills or reminders to the customer that a payment was
due, which saved them personnel time and cut expenses. The customer did not have to remember
to write checks and deliver them as the installment payments came due.
In Smith v. Gentilotti, 359 N.E.2d 953 (Mass. 1977), a father gave his son a PDC in 1969
with a maturity date in 1984. The PDC contained an acceleration clause which provided that the
funds to pay the PDC should be taken from the father's estate if the father died prior to the
maturity date of the PDC. As fate would have it, the father's demise was prior to 1984 and the
son made a claim against the father's estate for the amount of the check. The court held that the
estate was required to pay the check since it could not establish a valid defense against it.
15. Rogus v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 281 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. App. Ct.
1972). Rogus lent $18,000 to Blanding and received promissory note and PDCs as payment.
Blanding died before checks matured. Rogus sued on the note.
16. Debt collection agencies may save money and possibly eliminate the need to make fur-
ther collection efforts by using PDCs. In the event the PDC is dishonored, it may be easier to sue
on the instrument than on the underlying obligation. See U.C.C. § 3-802. Bill collectors are regu-
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longstanding practice of accepting PDCs from debtors as payment for
delinquent accounts. In developing countries that do not have the mod-
ern financial institutions like credit cards, automatic electronic funds
transfers,17 or margin trading in an active options market, 18 PDCs pro-
vide a functional alternative.
It is my undocumented opinion that PDCs are most frequently
used by lower and middle class consumers as a means of managing
their cash flow. The stated dates on the checks coincide with paydays.
Drawers of PDCs either cannot afford to pay an attorney to design a
more traditional instrument to defer payment, like a promissory note,
or the transaction is of such a relatively small magnitude that legal
expenses are unjustified.
This article will provide a better understanding of PDCs and sug-
gest resolutions to the problems that impede their usefulness. The first
part of the article explores and evaluates the problems peculiar to
PDCs under current law. The second part of the article reviews the
revisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and discusses how
the revisions affect the problems surrounding PDCs.
lated in their use of PDCs by the 1978 Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1693, which prohibits agencies from accepting checks postdated by more than five days unless the
agency notifies the debtor in writing, at least three days and not more than ten days, before it
intends to deposit the check. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (f)(a)(2)(1988).
17. Merchants in some developing countries, Chile for example, use PDCs as a substitute
for credit cards which are still in their infancy there. Shopkeepers allow customers to pay by
monthly installments against the guarantee of PDCs. This is a risky practice for the customer
since the shopkeepers can cash the checks before the agreed upon date. See Chilean Banks Re-
cover and Diversify, EUROMONEY, March 1988, at 10. It is illegal in Chile to cash checks
prior to the stated date. Furthermore, the penalty for issuing a check without sufficient funds is
instant jail.
18. The 1982 crisis in Kuwait's stock market was largely attributed to that country's
postdated check market. Kuwaiti speculators wrote $14 to $25 billion worth of PDCs to pay for
stocks. This is how the scheme worked:
The holder of, for example, KD 1 million worth of stocks estimated that they would be worth
in one year, say KD2 million. He then found a purchaser and received from the latter a check
dated a year hence for the total amount-the KD2 million. The seller then deposited the check or
disposed of it at a friendly bank at a discount.
The problems occurred when a high percentage of the PDCs bounced in a short period of
time, leaving a number of banks and other losing holders literally holding the baggage. The gov-
ernment had to determine whether and how to bail out the stock market and the thousands of
affected investors. In the end, corporate holders of the PDCs lost more than seventy-five percent of
the asset value of the PDCs carried on their books and hundreds of defaulters had bankrupt
estates heavily monitored by the government. See Stock Market Update: Guidelines on Postdated
Checks, 7 MIDDLE EAST EXECUrIVE REPORTS 17, 18 (Jan. 1984); Kuwait Currency Devaluation
(But They Thought about It), 6 MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REPORTS 4 (Feb. 1983).
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II. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE USE OF POSTDATED CHECKS
Premature payment is the common theme for most of the issues
involving PDCs. Drawers issue PDCs to postpone payment, and when
their accounts are debited earlier than anticipated, losses result. As in
the case involving the law professor and the daycare center, parties and
their attorneys will attempt to ferret out their relative rights and re-
sponsibilities using the U.C.C. as the primary source of law. This sec-
tion identifies the problems encountered by the parties to transactions
involving PDCs and discusses their various rights and obligations.
A. What is a Postdated Check?
Code definitions of PDCs have been plagued with ambiguity. 19
The U.C.C., its predecessor the Negotiable Instruments Law
20
(N.I.L.), and England's Bills of Exchange Act 1 (B.E.A.) which served
as a model for the N.I.L. all describe checks, with minor variations, as
drafts drawn on a bank and payable on demand.2 2 According to these
statutes, negotiable instruments, including checks, can be antedated or
postdated.2" The U.C.C. provides that postdated demand instruments
19. The court in Allied Color Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 484 F. Supp. 881,
883 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), grappled with the definition of a PDC. The court stated that a postdated
check presented for payment prior to the stated date is a "demand item" within the meaning of
U.C.C. § 4-302(a). Such an item is not a "check" as defined by § 3-104(2)(b) but rather is a
draft under § 3-104(2)(a). However, such a check is clearly an "item" as used by § 4-104(1)(g).
While a "demand item" as used by § 4-302(a), is nowhere defined in the U.C.C., the class of
"demand items" appears to be broader than the class of items "payable on demand," a determina-
tion supported both by § 3-114(2), which appears to contemplate the existence of instruments
"payable on demand" that are not in fact payable on demand until after a future date, might be
termed "demand instruments" and so would include postdated checks; and by § 3-122(1) which
also seems to contemplate the existence of "demand instruments" which include instruments that
do not become "payable on demand" until after a specified date sometime after the date of issue.
The court rejected the contention that a PDC was not a check but a note in In re Paraleo 42
Corp., 18 B.R. 433 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). But see Matathias v. Bel-Mar Lab., Inc., 222 N.E.2d
736 (N.Y. 1966) ("postdated checks are merely promissory notes").
20. See FREDERICK K. BEUTEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW V (7th ed. 1948). "The
Negotiable Instruments Law is based upon and largely copied from the English Bills of Exchange
Act, a codification of the law of England as to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and checks,
which was drawn by Judge Chalmers and enacted by parliament in 1882."
21. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 and 46 Vict., c.61.
22. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b) defines a check as a draft drawn on a bank payable on demand.
N.I.L. § 185 provides that a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand.
The B.E.A. § 73 describes a check as a bill of exchange drawn on a banker, payable on demand.
23. U.C.C. § 3-114 provides that "[tihe negotiability of an instrument is not affected by the
fact that it is undated, antedated or postdated." Furthermore, "[w]here an instrument is ante-
dated or postdated the time when it is payable is determined by the stated date if the instrument
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should be paid on the stated date. 4 Instruments payable on a stated
date are payable on or after the stated date. 5 These code provisions,
both applicable to PDCs, present a dilemma: how can an instrument be
both payable on demand and on or after a stated date?2e Instruments
payable on demand are payable whenever the holder decides to present
them for payment. If PDCs are payable on or after a stated date'2
they are not "payable on demand"; thus PDCs violate a fundamental
condition in the U.C.C. definition of "check." 28 A functional definition
can be derived by combining these two provisions: a PDC is a draft
drawn on a bank, payable on demand on or after the stated date. As a
result of the vagueness in the definition, courts and attorneys have to
grapple with the definition of PDCs in a way that would not be neces-
sary if the U.C.C. provided a clear and concise definition. 9
As one would expect, the courts in other countries whose laws
is payable on demand or at a fixed period after date." U.C.C. § 3-114(2). Similarly, N.I.L. § 12
provides that "[tlhe instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is antedated or postdated,
provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose." B.E.A. § 13 provides that "[a] bill
is not invalid by reason only that it is antedated or postdated, or that it bears date on a Sunday."
24. U.C.C. § 3-114(2).
25. Allied Credit Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 494 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (U.C.C. § 3-114(2) appears to contemplate the existence of instruments payable on demand
that are in fact not payable on demand until "after" a future date).
26. In Kuflik v. Vaccaro, 170 N.Y.S. 13 (1918), decided soon after the adoption of the
N.I.L., the court stated that a PDC is a negotiable instrument under the act. In his concurrence,
Judge Mullan argued that a PDC was not a negotiable instrument under the N.I.L., being neither
payable upon demand or at a fixed date, in accordance with § 23 or § 26 of the N.I.L. Judge
Mullan stated that a PDC is not a check because it is not payable upon demand and not a bill of
exchange payable upon demand or at a fixed future date. Since it did not fit within any of the
definitions of instruments covered by the act, the judge concluded that PDCs were nonnegotiable
under the N.I.L., despite the fact that under pre-N.I.L. law, PDCs were accepted as negotiable.
See BEUTEL, supra note 20, at 341-43. See also Triphonoff v. Sweeney, 130 P. 979 (Or. 1913);
Albert v. Hoffman, 117 N.Y.S. 1043 (1909).
27. Ordinary checks are payable within a reasonable time after issue. U.C.C. § 3-503(2)
provides:
In the case of an uncertified check which is drawn and payable within the United
States and which is not a draft drawn by a bank the following are presumed to be
reasonable periods within which to present for payment or to initiate a bank collection:
(a) with respect to liability of the drawer, thirty days after date or issue whichever is
later; and (b) with respect to the liability of an indorser, seven days after his
indorsement.
See Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 296 F. 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1924).
28. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b).
29. In People v. Gerber, 453 N.Y.S.2d 998 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982), the court stated: "Nor
does the U.C.C. provide a clear definition of a postdated check except that § 3-114 of the U.C.C.
says that the negotiability of an instrument is not affected by the fact that it is postdated."
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evolved from the British Commonwealth"0 are also fumbling around
trying to determine how to treat PDCs. A court in New South Wales
recently dealt with the issue of whether a PDC was a check. 81 In Aus-
tralia, the legal characterization of PDCs was still unsettled and the
subject of a hot judicial debate3 2 in a 1978 case which overruled a case
decided in 1895 which held that the true date of a PDC was the date of
its issue.33 If the "true date," which means maturity date or the date
upon which a PDC is properly payable, 4 of a PDC is the date of issue,
bankers could pay PDCs without regard to their stated date, contrary
to common practice in the United States, England, and Australia at the
time. 5 The earlier case and its unorthodox holding apparently did not
affect the established banking practice in Australia of paying PDCs
30. A description of the British Commonwealth countries and the relationship of English
law is outside of the scope of this article. See Report of Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of
Imperial Conference of 1926, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, Command No. 2768, 21 AMERI-
CAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1927) for description of the commonwealth, its devel-
opment and the application of British law to commonwealth countries.
31. In Hodgson & Lee Property Ltd. v. Mardonius Property Ltd., 78 A.L.R. 573 (Austl.
1986), the appellate court overruled the district court's ruling that postdated cheques were actu-
ally bills of exchange, payable otherwise than on demand, and as such could not be sued upon
without proof of presentment. With respect to PDC, the court of appeals stated, "[t]he postdated
cheques are not bills of exchange payable at some future time, but remained cheques within the
meaning of the act, payable on demand on or after the due date arrived." Undoubtedly, the lower
court classified the instruments as bills of exchange, but not cheques, because postdated "cheques"
cannot be payable on demand, which is part of the definition of cheque. See B.E.A. supra note 21,
§ 73.
32. For a concise essay on postdated cheques in Australia, see Craigie, Post-Dated Cheques,
11 AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS LAW R. 107 (1983).
33. Brien v. Dwyer, 141 C.L.R. 378 (Austl. 1978), overruled an earlier case MaGill v. Bank
of North Queensland, 6 Q.L.J. 262 (Austl. 1895), which raised some serious doubts over the legal
characterization of PDCs. MaGill decided that the true date of a PDC was the date of its issue:
Now a valid bill must in law have some date. Its validity is not affected by the wrong
date being written upon it, or by its having no date so written. By holding that the true
date of the bill is the date of its 'issue' as defined by the Act, all these provisions are
reconciled. And I think this is the necessary construction of the provisions of the Act to
which reference has been made. The true date of the bill or cheque in question was
therefore the day when it was issued by the plaintiff.
The "Act" referred to above is the Bills of Exchange Act of 1884 (Qld) which was patterned after
and is essentially the same as The United Kingdom Act of 1882. See Craigie, supra note 32, at
107. The "provisions" referred to define bill of exchange and cheque, and provide for maturity of
a bill, completion of undated bills, and validity of undated, antedated or postdated bills.
34. See infra notes 40-61 and accompanying text (discussion of properly payable rule and
its application to PDC).
35. The holding was rejected by courts in New Zealand and Canada, respectively. See Pol-
lock v. Bank of New Zealand, 20 N.Z.L.R. 174, 179-81 (P.C. 1901); Keyes v. Royal Bank of
Canada, 3 D.L.R. 161, 165 (1947).
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only after their stated dates.3 6
The United States along with a host of other former British colo-
nies, including the British Commonwealth countries, drafted and
adopted laws patterned after the B.E.A., thus casting PDCs into the
abyss of vagueness written into that act. Over a half century and many
controversial court cases later, drafters of the U.C.C. did not find it
necessary to add clarity to the definition of PDC and pretty much left
the substance of the N.I.L. definition of PDC intact. Currently, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NC
CUSL)17 has adopted a draft of revisions to Articles 3 and 4 of the
36. See, e.g., Brien v. Dwyer, 141 C.L.R. 378, 399 (Austl. 1978) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
See also Craigie, supra note 32, at 111.
The court in Brien cleared up the controversy, created by MaGill, over the maturity date of
PDCs by acknowledging that PDCs are payable at a future date. However, concurring Judge
Aickin went on to classify PDCs as valid instruments, but not cheques:
No doubt a postdated cheque is a valid instrument. However, it is not a 'cheque' within
the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act which by section 78(1) defines a cheque as a
'bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand'. It is, I think, clear that a
post-dated cheque is a bill of exchange payable at a future date.
141 C.L.R. at 407-08.
Craigie, an authority on Australian commercial law, argued that refusing to accord PDCs the
status of checks created problems for bankers in Australia. The Bill of Exchange Act provides
protections to bankers in § 65 (forged instrument), § 80 (stale check), § 81(b) (determination of
authority to pay by notice of customer's death), § 86 (paying crossed checks to a banker), § 88B
(paying indorsed check to a banker), § 88D (collecting banker) and § 88E (lien on unindorsed
check) that apply only when bankers deal with checks. Since the court said PDCs were not
checks, it is Craigie's contention that the protections do not apply to PDCs.
In his attempt to sort out the state of the law in Australia, Craigie examined the treatment of
PDCs in England. He found that well into the second half of the nineteenth century bankers in
England had an established custom of not paying PDCs which were presented prior to their date.
According to Craigie, that practice found its origins in early stamp duty legislation which imposed
heavy penalties on the use of PDCs. The practice continued after the stamp act legislation was
repealed and became a common provision in the banker-customer contract. Thus, although PDCs
were recognized negotiable instruments at law, it was common banking practice to treat them
otherwise. Craigie found that this state of affairs prevailed up until the time that Chalmers
drafted the Bills of Exchange Act. Upon review of Chalmers' writings prior to drafting the Bills of
Exchange Act, Craigie concluded that "Chalmers found the law on post dated cheques to be in a
somewhat equivocal state, and that it was allowed to remain in that state after the passing of the
Act." Craigie, supra note 32, at 111.
37. The purpose of the NCCUSL was to promote uniformity in the law amongst states on
subjects as to which uniformity was desirable and practical. It grew out of an American Bar
Association Committee in 1889. By 1912 all states appointed commissioners, which currently
range in number from I to 9. The NCCUSL appoints drafting committees of 5 to 9 members to
prepare drafts of legislation which must eventually receive the approval of the NCCUSL and be
adopted by the state legislatures. See BENFIELD & JENNER, The Process of Changing the U.C.C.,
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, THE EMERGING NEW U.C.C. (Sept. 7-9, 1989).
The final draft of revisions to Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. were approved by the NCCUSL
on July 13, 1990 [hereinafter "Final Draft"].
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U.C.C" The draft legislation will be presented to state legislatures
throughout the country for expeditious adoption. The revised Articles 3
and 4 add an element of clarity to the definition of PDC and will be
discussed in Part III of this article.
89
B. The Properly Payable Rule
Although the U.C.C. uses permissive language in § 4-401, payor
banks are required to pay checks that are properly payable and the
bank must precisely follow the instructions of the customer. "' If the
bank fails to follow the customer's instructions, the bank could be lia-
ble to the customer for the amount of the check and possibly for dam-
ages for wrongful dishonor."1 When the customer postdates a check,
the customer has instructed the bank not to pay the check until the
stated date, and if the bank pays the check before the stated date the
bank must put the money back into the customer's account. "2 Since
PDCs are not properly payable until their stated date,"3 banks are ex-
posed to liability to the customer for losses resulting from paying PDCs
prior to such date in two ways: (1) if the customer experiences a loss
because the premature payment precluded the customer from giving
the bank a timely stop-payment order on the PDC44; and (2) if other
checks, presented after the account was depleted from the payment of
38. The subjects of Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. are negotiable instruments, bank depos-
its, and collections, respectively.
39. See infra notes 122-27.
40. U.C.C. § 4-401 provides: 1) As against its customer, a bank may charge against his
account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account even though the charge
creates an overdraft.
It is implicit that the bank cannot charge items against the customer's account that are not
properly payable, like PDCs that are presented prior to their stated date. If a charge is unautho-
rized, it follows that the depositor has a valid claim to the amount of the charge. But cf. Stone &
Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 184 N.E.2d 358 (Mass. 1962).
41. U.C.C. § 4-402(b), supra note 2.
42. WHALEY, THE LAW OF CHECKING ACCOUNTS (1990) (available in Ohio State Univ.
Law School Library or through Commercial Law Lectures, Inc.).
43. See U.C.C. § 3-114(2), supra note 23.
44. U.C.C. § 4-303 provides that a stop-payment order comes too late if it is received after
the bank has paid the item or settled for the item without a right to revoke settlement. U.C.C. §
4-403 provides:
(1) A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable for his
account but the order must be received at such time and in such manner as to afford
the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank with
respect to the item described in 4-303.
If the bank pays a PDC prior to its stated date, the customer/drawer loses the opportunity to
make a timely stop-payment order.
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the PDC, were dishonored. The two hypotheticals below are
illustrative.
Illustration I
Chris Customer issued a $200 check on January 1, 1990 dated Febru-
ary 15, 1990 to Paul Payee as payment for a used waterbed. Payee
and Customer agreed that if the waterbed leaked Payee would return
the check and Customer would return the bed. Payee indorsed the
check to Ivy Indorsee who paid Payee $175 on January 15, 1990. Ivy
deposited the check into her personal checking account on January
16, 1990, and Ivy's bank forwarded the check for collection. 5 Cus-
tomer's bank overlooked the date on the check, paid the item on Janu-
ary 17, 1990 and debited Customer's account for $200. Customer fil-
led the waterbed on January 20, 1990 and finding that it leaked,
immediately informed Paul of her intent to return the bed and pick up
the check. Paul informed Customer that the check had been indorsed
over to Ivy. Customer called her bank and demanded an immediate
stop payment46 on the check only to be informed that the check had
already been paid.
Illustration 2
Customer wrote a $200 check payable to Peter Payee on March 1,
1990 dated March 15, 1990. March 14 was Customer's payday, and
Customer anticipated that she would not have sufficient funds to cover
the check and other outstanding checks prior to her payday. Peter
Payee deposited the check into his checking account on March 3,
1990 and Peter's bank forwarded the check for collection. Customer's
bank paid the check on March 4, 1990 and subtracted $200 from
Customer's account balance. On March 7, 1990 Customer's bank re-
turned a $50 check payable to the electric company due to insufficient
funds in Customer's account. On March 9, 1990 Customer's bank re-
turned a $100 check payable to Aetna Ins. Co.
In both Illustrations Customer's bank should not have paid the
45. A network which includes the Federal Reserve Banks, local and regional clearing
houses, and banking institutions make up the bank collection system. The system is regulated by
U.C.C. Article 4, Federal Reserve Board Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. part 210, and The Expedited
Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010. A check passes from the bank where it is depos-
ited, the depositary bank, to one or more intermediary or collecting banks which often include at
least one Federal Reserve Bank, and is finally presented to the drawee/payor bank for payment.
For general discussion of the check-collection process, see WHALEY, supra note 9, at 247-86
(1988).
46. U.C.C. § 4-403, supra note 44.
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PDC when presented and had no right at the time of presentment to
charge the check against Customer's account.' 7 The U.C.C. established
the rights of the customer and the bank with a two-part adjustment, "a
described by the court in Siegel v. New England Merchant's Bank 49 as
follows: "The depositor has a claim against the bank for the amount
improperly debited from its account, and the bank has a claim against
the depositor based on the subrogation of rights of the payee and other
holders. The bank may assert its rights defensively when its depositor
brings an action for wrongful debit." 50
The first question in applying the two-part test is whether Cus-
tomer has a claim against the bank, which would make the bank liable
to Customer. Second, it must be determined if Customer would be un-
justly enriched if the bank is required to credit Customer's account for
the entire $200. If the bank's payment discharges a legal obligation of
Customer or establishes a right in favor of Customer, it would be un-
fair to allow Customer to retain such benefits without paying for them.
The U.C.C. provides for those occasions that might result in unjust
enrichment in § 4-407.1 The practical effect of U.C.C. § 4-407 is that
the bank will only have to pay Customer if the bank caused the loss,
and even then the bank will not have to pay if the bank can find a prior
47. Siegel v. New England Merchant's Bank, 437 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Mass. 1982). The bank
paid a postdated check before maturity and deducted the amount of the check from the deposi-
tor's account. When the customer learned of this, he informed the bank that the check was
postdated and asked the bank to stop payment on the check. When the bank refused to restore the
funds, the customer brought an action for wrongful debit of his account. The court ordered that
the funds be restored, subject to the bank's subrogation to the rights of prior holders. Id. See also
Smith v. Gentilotti, 359 N.E.2d 953 (Mass. 1977). Peck v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), overrules Dousmanis v. Colonial Bank, 235 N.Y.S. 489, affd,
240 N.Y.S. 874 (1929), to the extent that Dousmanis held that a depositor had an unfettered
right to recover from the bank for paying a postdated check before its date. No subrogation rights
were asserted by the bank in Dousmanis, a pre-U.C.C. case.
48. Siegel, 437 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1982).
49. 437 N.E.2d 218 (1982).
50. Id. at 221.
51. U.C.C. § 4-407 provides:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer or maker
or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the drawer or maker,
to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the
bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank shall be subrogated to the
rights (a) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or maker; and (b)
of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer or maker either on the
item or under the transaction out of which the item arose; and (c) of the drawer or
maker against the payee or any other holder of the item with respect to the transaction
out of which the item arose.
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party with a valid claim against Customer. The bank can assert such
prior party's rights against Customer.5
In Illustration 1, Customer issued the PDC anticipating that the
check would not be cashed if the waterbed leaked. Furthermore, since
the waterbed did leak and Customer subsequently attempted to stop
payment prior to the stated date on the check,53 the bank's premature
payment caused a loss to Customer. Unfortunately for Customer, if the
bank can find a prior party, such as a holder or a holder in due
course,54 with a valid claim against Customer, the bank still wins.
Since Ivy Indorsee paid value for the check, if Ivy 1) had no
knowledge that Customer could bring the waterbed back in the event
that it was faulty, or 2) any other notice that would alert Ivy that there
may be a claim against the instrument, 55 Ivy may be a holder in due
course.5  The bank could step into Ivy's shoes and use Ivy's rights
against Customer to make a claim for payment 57 to prevail against
Customer. Should there be a defect in the rights of Ivy against Cus-
tomer, the bank could step into the shoes of the depositary bank, Ivy's
bank.58 The subrogation rights in U.C.C. § 4-407 increases the likeli-
52. For an excellent concise treatment of § 4-407 subrogation rights as they pertain to
PDCs see WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 659-61 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
W&S].
53. If customer had waited until after the stated date to attempt a stop-payment the loss
would have resulted even if the bank had refused to pay the item until the stated date. The
premature payment, in such a case, is not the cause of the loss.
54. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) defines holder as:
"'Holder' means a person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument
or a certificated investment security drawn issued or endorsed to him or his order or to
bearer or in blank."
"'Holder In Due Course' is defined in U.C.C. § 3-302 as:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any person."
See W&S, supra note 52, at ch. 14, for extensive treatment of the subject.
55. For a discussion of the effect that knowledge that the instrument was postdated has on
holder in due course status see infra notes 102-09.
56. U.C.C. § 3-302, supra note 54. A holder in due course takes the instrument free from
all claims to it and all defenses of any party with whom the holder has not dealt with a very
limited list of exceptions that, generally, includes infancy, incapacity, duress, illegality, fraud in
factum, and bankruptcy discharge. See U.C.C. § 3-305, infra note 102.
57. This is a right not a claim. Ivy has been paid so Ivy is not making any claims; however,
if Ivy would have a right to make a claim if Ivy had not been paid, the bank can assert that right.
58. See U.C.C. §§ 4-208 and 4-209 to determine the extent that the depositary bank has
given value for purposes of establishing holder in due course status.
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hood of success for the bank when customers, like Chris Customer in
Illustration 1, seek reimbursement for the amount of the item. Accord-
ing to White and Summers, "while postdated checks may be techni-
cally not properly payable, as a practical matter the payor bank will
often prevail." 9
Banks may not be as likely to prevail when the customer seeks
damages for wrongful dishonor of checks that were not paid due to
depletion of the account resulting from the premature payment of the
PDC60 It stands to reason that if the account balance reflected the
appropriate amount, the checks would not have been dishonored and
therefore the dishonor was wrongful. If the customer can demonstrate
an injury then the customer should recover. According to U.C.C. § 4-
402, the damages must be actual, proximately caused, and proved;
damages for arrest or prosecution or other consequential damages are
recoverable. That language most certainly would include, in Illustration
1, the returned check fees charged by Customer's bank against Cus-
tomer's account when the checks were returned. Fees for returned
checks charged Customer by the payees are also covered. Customer's
right to recover is not limited to fees, but may include other damages
as long as they are actual, proximate, and proved.61
In Illustration 2, the bank wrongfully dishonored checks made
payable to the electric company and the insurance company. If electri-
cal service was discontinued as a result of the bounced check, Customer
could prove consequential damages such as reconnection fees or loss of
electrical service and all the inconveniences encountered as a result. On
the other hand, returning the check to the electric company was not
likely the proximate cause of lost income resulting from Customer's
failure of a real estate exam because Customer was unable to study
without electrical lights. Query-whether the bank could be held re-
sponsible for lost benefits due to a lapsed insurance policy?
59. See W&S, supra note 52, at 661.
60. In Smith v. Maddox-Rucker Banking Co., 68 S.E. 1092 (Ga. Ct. App. 1910), the bank
was held responsible for wrongful dishonor under those circumstances. This was a pre-code case;
however, W&S are of the opinion that nothing in the code changes the outcome. See W&S, supra
note 52, at 660.
61. U.C.C. § 4-403(3) provides: "The burden of establishing the fact and amount of loss
resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop payment order is on the
customer."
In Siegel v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 437 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 1982), the court
analogized the loss from premature payment of a PDC with payment over a stop-payment order
and assigned the burden of proving loss accordingly. The burden of establishing the fact and
amount of the loss is on the customer.
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C. Reimbursement of Customer's Account
Even if the customer has suffered no loss, such as described above,
the customer has the right to demand that the bank reimburse the cus-
tomer's account for the amount of the PDC prior to the stated date on
the check. For example, if a check for $20,000 is dated November 1,
1990, and the bank pays the check prematurely on May 1, 1990, the
customer has a right to demand that her account be reimbursed for the
$20,000 immediately, since the check was not properly payable. 2
Under such circumstances, the bank is obliged to reimburse the cus-
tomer's account. If the bank has already made final payment6 s on the
check and has thereby become accountable for it, the bank would be
responsible for the $20,000 until November 1, 1990. On the stated date
of the check the bank has a right to reimburse itself out of the cus-
tomer's account for the amount of the PDC."
D. Certification of Postdated Checks
There is very little reason for the payee of a check to seek certifi-
cation a6 since checks, with the exception of PDCs, are immediately
payable on demand. On the other hand, nothing prevents the holder of
a check from requesting certification. The bank has no obligation to
certify a check,66 and refusal to certify does not constitute dishonor;
67
62. See generally Seigle v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 437 N.E.2d 218 (Mass.
1982).
63. "Final Payment" is defined in U.C.C. § 4-213.
64. Roland v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 463 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (when no
complaint or stop-payment was made prior to the stated date of a PDC, paid prior to the stated
date on the PDC, the bank had a right to reimburse itself from the customer's account).
If the bank is required to reimburse the customer's account for a PDC for the period of time
between premature payment and the stated date of the PDC, the bank bears the risk that the
customer will deplete or close the account during the interim and that funds will not be available
in the account on the stated date of the PDC. If the customer does not have sufficient funds on
deposit to cover the instrument on the stated date the bank would have the right to receive a
refund from the customer, based upon the deposit contract or the subrogation rights in U.C.C. §
4-407.
65. U.C.C. § 3-411(1) provides: "Certification of a check is acceptance." Acceptance is
defined in U.C.C. § 3-410(1): "Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft
as presented."
66. U.C.C. § 3-411(2). However, if a bank refuses to certify a check that the bank would
have refused to pay, there has been a dishonor. Gallinaro v. Fitzpatrick, 267 N.E.2d 649 (Mass.
1971).
67. A postdated check cannot be dishonored before its stated date. Wilson v. McEachern,
71 S.E. 946 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911); National Park Bank v. Saitta, Ill N.Y.S. 927 (1908). See also
Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (bank's
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however, if the bank chooses to certify a check, the drawer and all
prior indorsers are discharged. 8
Holders of PDCs have more incentive to seek certification than
holders of checks which are immediately payable. Since certification is
an acceptance by the bank,69 certification operates as the bank's signed
engagement to honor the check as presented." The acceptance of a
particularly reliable institution like a bank could enhance the value of a
PDC and the ability of the holder to negotiate it further.
For example, suppose on May 1, Paul Payee is holder of a $10,000
check, drawn by Chris Customer, payable on November 1. Paul could
decide to hold the check until November 1 and then deposit it in his
account or present it on that date for payment over the counter at
Chris' bank. Paul could also negotiate the check to someone else, like
Ivy Indorsee, who, in exchange for Paul's indorsement on the check and
delivery of the check to Ivy,7 1 might be willing to give Paul money for
the check. It is likely that Ivy will want to discount the check by at
least the amount of interest that she could earn on $10,000 for the
period of time prior to the stated date. Unless Chris is known and
trusted by Ivy, she might also desire to discount the check for an
amount that represents the risk that Chris will not have funds on de-
posit to cover the check when the check is presented. If Paul is able to
get the check certified by Chris' bank, instead of relying upon the
credit worthiness of Chris, Ivy could depend upon the bank for its
guaranteed payment, which is less risky than relying upon Chris for
payment. The amount of the discount should be reduced accordingly;
the risk that the bank will not pay an item after it has been accepted
may have a value of $0, since absent a bank failure the bank is re-
quired to pay. Thus, by getting the PDC certified, Peter has enhanced
the probability of payment, reduced the risk of nonpayment to Ivy, and
thereby increased the present value of the PDC.
The bank has every incentive not to certify PDCs. When the bank
representations to payee that the customer's account has sufficient funds to cover five postdated
checks for $20,000 each does not constitute an acceptance, because acceptance must be written;
however, bank may be liable to payee for bank's negligence in reporting the status of the cus-
tomer's account).
68. U.C.C. § 3-411(1), supra note 65.
69. Id.
70. U.C.C. § 3-410(1), supra note 65.
71. U.C.C. § 3-202(1) defines negotiation: "Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in
such form that the transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negoti-
ated by delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery."
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certifies a PDC upon the request of the holder, the bank cannot imme-
diately debit the account of the drawer for the amount of the check, in
the same manner as one would expect upon the certification of an ordi-
nary check.72 The customer's account should not be debited until the
stated date on the check because that is when the check becomes prop-
erly payable.73 In the example above, if the bank certified the check on
Paul's request on May 1, the bank would be obligated to pay the in-
strument on November 1, without regard to the status of Chris' ac-
count on that date.7 4 Chris would be discharged from liability as a re-
sult of the certification. 76 In essence, the bank rather than Ivy or Paul
would assume the risk that Chris would have sufficient funds in the
account to cover the check on November 1. Absent some agreement or
special relationship with the customer, there is no reason for the bank
to assume such exposure to loss.
76
E. Contract Provisions Limiting the Bank's Liability
Since PDCs expose banks to liability for premature payment, and
the current technology for processing checks is not designed to spot
PDCs, it is not surprising that some banks have included provisions in
their deposit contracts which 1) limit the customer's right to issue
PDCs or 2) limit the bank's liability for the premature payment of
PDCs. First, the validity of such provisions must be evaluated in light
of U.C.C. § 4-103(1)77 which allows the provision of Article 4 to be
72. Steffen and Starr, A Blueprint for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 467
(1935).
73. See supra notes 40-61.
74. See CLARK, supra note 10, at 2-15; U.C.C. §§ 3-410 and 3-411, supra note 65.
75. U.C.C. § 3-411(1), supra note 65.
76. The bank has a limited rule to cancel certification. See generally Annotation, Right Of
Bank To Cancel Certification, 25 A.L.R.3d. 1367, 1369.
As a general rule, a bank may cancel or rescind its certification of a check or note,
provided that no rights of persons other than the holder have intervened, and that the
situation or rights of the holder have not been so changed between the time of the
certification and its cancellation as to render it inequitable to permit a revocation. This
rule has been applied regardless of the nature of the mistake, and hence has been ap-
plied both to mistakes as to the amount of the funds of the drawer or maker, and to
mistakes in overlooking stop-payment orders.
Id.
Under this rule, the bank should have no right to cancel when there were sufficient funds in
the account at the time of certification, but not at the time of presentation since there was no
mistake. As a practical matter, however, banks do not certify checks without "holding" funds in
the account, absent a special arrangement with the depositor.
77. U.C.C. § 4-103(1) provides:
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varied by contract, but prohibits a bank from disclaiming responsibility
for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care. Sec-
ondly, if such agreements are within the limitations prescribed in
U.C.C. § 4-103, what form must they take in order to establish a bind-
ing contract between the customer and the bank?
Clark78 classified PDCs as conditional instruments, 9 which I think
stretches the concept of conditionality beyond its reasonable parame-
ters. If a future date for payment constitutes a "condition" for a PDC,
it should likewise be a "condition" when included in a promissory note.
Clark's creative classification does not detract from his analysis of the
issue of the bank's disclaimer of responsibility:
On the one hand, payment of a conditional check contrary to the con-
dition would seem to constitute negligence which cannot be disclaimed
by the drawee bank. On the other hand, the bank has gone one step
further, by prohibiting the customer from drawing such checks alto-
gether, so that the provision is not just a simple disclaimer of
negligence.
But is the right to draw conditional or postdated checks so fundamen-
tal to the deposit contract that it cannot be contracted away? It seems
likely that some courts construing § 4-103(1) may in the future con-
sider such clauses as invalid back-door methods of disclaiming negli-
gence contrary to the policy of article 4.8o
Clark's supposition, that provisions limiting the bank's liability for
"payment of a conditional check contrary to the condition would seem
to constitute negligence which cannot be disclaimed by the drawee
bank" because of U.C.C. § 4-103(1), found some support in the courts
prior to the section's adoption. In Montano v. Springfield Gardens Na-
tional Bank,81 the court contended with the issue of whether a state-
ment, limiting the bank's liability for early payment of PDCs, included
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement except that no
agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure
to exercise ordinary care or can limit the measure of damages for such lack or failure;
but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which such responsibility
is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
78. See CLARK, supra note 10.
79. Although Clark states that PDCs are conditional, Clark acknowledges that PDCs are
negotiable under U.C.C. § 3-114.
80. BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 2-16
(2d ed. 1981).
81. 140 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1955).
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at the bottom of a quarterly statement of account was binding. The
court concluded that even if the provision had been binding,8 2 it was
difficult to conceive that such a payment was not made without care-
lessness on the part of an officer or employee of the bank and held that
the bank was liable for the premature payment.83 However, the court in
Kalish v. Manufacturers Trust Co.,8" upheld a contract provision
which explicitly relieved the bank of liability for payment of postdated
items through error, inadvertence, negligence, or carelessness. 85
Whether Kalish would be decided the same under the U.C.C. depends
upon whether the bank's failure to detect a PDC and refuse payment
prior to the stated date constitutes negligence.
Bankers have a plausible argument that payment of a PDC prior
to the stated date does not constitute negligence. After all, the current
technology employed by bankers does not identify PDCs once they
have entered the stream of processing. Premature payment of PDCs is
a common problem in the industry because of bankers' inability to de-
tect them. The reason that PDCs presented prior to their stated dates
are paid early is because bankers do not examine the date on checks
when they are presented for payment. In many cases the physical item
is not present when presentment is made. 6 Personnel trained to intake
checks look for the amount, which is then encoded on the check in
mechanically readable form, and a signature. The date is not encoded
on the check.87 As a result, from the bankers' perspective, PDCs are
often paid prior to their stated date despite the bank's use of ordinary
care and lack of negligence, and therefore contract provisions limiting
the bank's liability for the premature payment of PDCs do not consti-
82. The court concluded that the limitation on liability for prepayment of the PDC was not
binding because the customer did not have notice of the provision at the time the depositary
contract was signed.
83. Montano v. Springfield Gardens Nat'l Bank, 140 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955).
84. 191 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1959).
85. Id. at 62. In support of its decision the Kalish court cited Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 167
N.E. 203, 204 (1929) which held: "The common-law liability of a bank in regard to a specific
transaction may be limited provided the limitation has the assent of the depositor. In such a
situation the clearly expressed intention of the parties will prevail and the rule of 'freedom of
contract' will be enforced."
86. In many truncation schemes the physical item is retained by the depositary bank or lock
box operation. See infra note 174 for description of lock box operations.
87. It is also worthy of noting that an individual banker could not incorporate a system
which includes the encoding of dates on checks. Any change in technological processes would have
to take place industrywide since uniformity is essential to the clearing house system currently
employed nationwide to process checks.
The encoding is done with a process called Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR).
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tute a disclaimer of negligence in violation of U.C.C. § 4-103, and
should be enforceable.
The problem with the bankers' argument is that they excuse their
failure to detect PDCs by asserting the limitations of "current technol-
ogy." There is a difference, I think, between "current technology em-
ployed" and "current technology available." My discussions with bank-
ers and computer technicians have revealed that it is feasible for
bankers to encode the dates of checks on the checks and program, and
adapt the machines that process checks to read the dates, if the bank-
ing industry chose to employ such technology. For bankers it is not a
matter of what current technology "cannot" do; rather it is a matter of
what it "does not" do. Since the technology is available, and since
bankers are aware that prematurely presented PDCs are not detected
by the existing technology, the bankers may be negligent for failing to
employ the available technology. 8
The success or failure of the bankers' argument depends upon
whether ordinary care as used in U.C.C. § 4-103 is broadly or narrowly
construed, with the more narrow construction favoring nonnegligence
of bankers and enforcement of contract provisions limiting liability.
Banks could, as an alternative to limiting their liability for premature
payment of PDCs, include a provision in their deposit contracts which
prohibits their customers from issuing PDCs. Clark describes contract
provisions that prohibit the writing of PDCs as "invalid back-door
methods of disclaiming negligence." If courts decide that contract pro-
visions which limit the bank's liability for premature payment of PDCs
are unenforceable because the provisions violate U.C.C. § 4-103, it
should follow that contract provisions which prohibit the customer from
writing PDCs should likewise be held invalid for the same reason.
Therefore, the validity of both contract provisions will depend upon
whether bankers are negligent for failing to identify PDCs and post-
poning payment until the stated date.
When banks rely upon contract provisions to avoid liability for
premature payment of PDCs, the customer must agree to the provi-
88. The issue of available versus employed technology was contemplated by the court in
Parr v. Security Nat'l Bank, 680 P.2d 648 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984). In Parr, the bank paid a check
even though it had received a stop-payment order from its customer. The customer had misstated
the amount of the check by 50 cents in the stop-payment order. The bank's technology only identi-
fied checks for stop-payment by the exact amount of the check. The court held that the customer
had identified the check with reasonable accuracy and that the bank should bear losses incurred
by the limitations in its technology. See also FJS Electronics v. Fidelity Bank, 431 A.2d 326 (Pa.
1981).
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sions.1s An agreement can be found in the contract language or by im-
plication from other circumstances including usage of trade, course of
dealing, or course of performance.90 Does a customer have such full
recognition of a provision included in the fine print on the signature
card,9" at the foot of a statement of account mailed quarterly,92 in the
bank regulations,93 or in several documents (signature card, bank ac-
count agreement, and depositor's contract)?O"
The outcome of the cases is varied enough to suggest that banks
should give their customers notice at the time that the contract is
signed95 of the terms and provisions of the "agreement" between the
customer and the bank, especially when those agreements vary the
rights that the customer would have under the law.
F. Consideration for Contract Purposes
In Esecson v. Bushnell96 the purchaser in a condominium sales
contract argued that the PDC given as earnest money, on which the
purchaser stopped payment prior to its stated date, rendered the con-
tract void for lack of consideration.9" The appellate court disagreed
with the purchaser and the trial court and stated that a check is a.
legally enforceable obligation of the maker,9" upon which the maker
remains bound despite the stop-payment order.99 The court held that a
89. Comment 2 to § 4-103(1) describes agreement:
As used here 'agreement' has the meaning given it by § 1-201(3). The agreement may
be direct, as between the owner and the depositary bank; or indirect, as where the
owner authorizes a particular type of procedure and any bank in the collection chain
acts pursuant to such procedure . . . . Legends on deposit tickets, collection letters and
acknowledgement of items, coupled with action by the affected party constituting ac-
ceptance . . . are agreements ....
90. U.C.C. § 1-201(3), definition of agreement.
91. See David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1960)
(fine print clause in a signature card waiving the customer's right to a jury trial was effective as
an agreement under § 4-103(1)).
92. Montano v. Springfield Gardens Nat'l Bank, 140 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955).
93. Reidman v. Long Island Trust Co., 370 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (bank
failed to prove by any competent evidence that the plaintiff had assented to bank's regulation
limiting its liability).
94. Kalish v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 191 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (1959).
95. See generally Montano, 140 N.Y.S.2d 63.
96. 663 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983).
97. Id. The seller in Esecson was attempting to enforce a liquidated damages clause which
forfeited the earnest money to the seller in the event the purchaser did not tender performance.
98. Id. at 890.
99. Id. The court noted that the stop-payment order forbids payment by the bank to the
payee or indorser, but the maker is still liable.
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PDC constitutes valid consideration for a contract.100
The argument that PDCs do not constitute consideration fails for
the same reason as the argument that PDCs are conditional. 101 Other
types of negotiable instruments are frequently made payable in the fu-
ture, which does not affect their value as consideration necessary to
establish a contract. On the issue of contract consideration, there is no
reason to treat PDCs any differently than other negotiable instruments
with similar characteristics.
G. Effect Upon Holder in Due Course Status
Holder in due course is a status coveted by plaintiffs in actions on
negotiable instruments. Since holders in due course take instruments
free from all claims and most defenses, 102 plaintiffs who are holders in
due course significantly enhance their chances of winning lawsuits. In
order to qualify as a holder in due course the holder must take the
instrument for value, in good faith, without notice that it is overdue or
has been dishonored, and without notice of any defense against or
claim to the instrument on the part of any person. 03 U.C.C. § 3-
304(4)(a) specifically provides that notice that the instrument is ante-
dated or postdated does not give the holder notice of a defense or claim;
thus, standing alone, the taking of a PDC does not destroy holder in
due course status.'04 However, suppose a holder took a PDC with the
100. Id.
101. See supra note 80.
102. U.C.C. § 3-305 provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt
except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, duress, or illegality of the transaction as renders
the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument
with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.
The defenses in paragraphs (2)(a)-(e) have been characterized as "real" defenses as contrasted
with "personal" defenses. Holders in due course take negotiable instruments free from all personal
defenses.
103. U.C.C. § 3-302(1), supra note 54.
104. The official comment to U.C.C. § 3-304 states in paragraph 8, "Paragraph (a) of sub-
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intention of presenting it prior to the stated date.106 Certainly such a
holder did not take the instrument in good faith, and therefore would
not qualify as a holder in due course. But what about the holder who
took the PDC with the good faith intention of presenting it on or after
the stated date, but decided in the interim to present it early? Would
such a holder qualify as a holder in due course? 06 Holder in due
course status is established at the time the holder "takes" the instru-
ment. Can a holder in due course lose that status by thereafter acting
in bad faith? The answer to that question is a resolute no; there is no
precedence for destroying holder in due course status after it is
acquired.107
The holder in due course who makes a premature presentment
may nonetheless be exposed to the claims and defenses of those parties
with whom he has dealt, because U.C.C. § 3-305(2) only frees the
holder in due course from the defenses of parties with whom the holder
has not "dealt." If the holder has "dealt" unfairly with the drawer,
then the holder should be exposed to the defenses of the drawer as a
section (4) rejects decisions holding that an instrument known to be antedated or postdated is not
regular. Such knowledge does not prevent a holder from taking in due course."
105. Subjective intentions are difficult to prove and do not make the best foundation upon
which to build a lawsuit. The intention of the party may be inferred from the circumstances, such
as when a check postdated by three months is presented for payment on the day or week after
receipt. Unless rebutted by evidence demonstrating mistake or inadvertence, the proximity of the
presentation for payment to the issuance coupled with a long period of time between presentment
and the stated date could provide adequate evidence of the holder's subjective intentions at the
time the instrument was taken.
106. Courts have recognized holder in due course status for holders who present PDCs prior
to their stated dates. See Roland v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 463 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1971)
(the court held that the drawee bank was a holder in due course of checks dated April 14 that
were paid by the drawee on April 10. "When the bank paid Jastrow the face value of the checks
on April 10, it became a holder in due course of the checks ...."). The holding is clearly wrong
since the drawee bank does not "take" the instrument pursuant to a negotiation and is thus not a
holder; one must be a holder to become a holder in due course. See generally U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-
202, and 1-201(20).
107. The application of the shelter rule found in U.C.C. § 3-201 provides an excellent ex-
ample of stamina of holder in due course status. That rule states: "Transfer of an instrument vests
in the transferee such rights as the transferor has therein, except that a transferee who has himself
been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice
of a defense or claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due
course." Example (d) in comment number 3 to that section presents a hypothetical in which a
holder in due course gains knowledge of fraud after acquiring the instrument and then transfers it
to a third party who qualifies as a holder in due course. Upon repurchasing the instrument from
the third party, the holder in due course does not acquire the holder in due course rights of the
third party because his position is not "improved" thereby; there is no room for improvement since
the original holder already had holder in due course status.
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result.
The holder who presents the PDC for payment prematurely will
either deposit the check in the holder's bank or present the check to the
payor bank for payment. If the check is deposited and the depositary
bank overlooks the date on the check, it will probably be sent through
the collection chain and probably paid by the drawee. Although the
payor bank cannot be a holder in due course because it is not a holder,
the depositary bank may be eligible for holder in due course status.
The depositary bank's holder in due course status may be challenged if
it has notice of a claim or defense or lacks good faith.
Good faith is measured subjectively in the U.C.C., and I feel safe
in asserting that banks satisfy the standard in most of their transac-
tions. Banks do not deliberately pay or present PDCs prior to their
stated dates. Rather, banks fail to notice the dates; thus qualifying as
empty-headed and good-hearted. If depositary banks fail to obtain
holder in due course status it more likely will be because they have
notice of a claim or defense against the instrument.
A depositary bank that pays a PDC prior to its stated date has
constructive notice of the date on the instrument even if the bank does
not take actual notice since the date is on the face of the instrument.
But notice of postdating is not enough to destroy holder in due course
status.108 The depositary bank must also have notice that there is a
claim or defense against the instrument. U.C.C. § 1-201(25) provides
that a person has notice of a fact when from all the facts and circum-
stances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know it
exists. Since the depositary bank has constructive notice of the postdat-
ing, it has reason to know of the drawer's claim against the payor bank
for improper payment when the item is presented to the payor bank
and paid which should preclude the depositary bank from establishing
holder in due course status. 109
108. U.C.C. § 3-304(4)(a).
109. Depositary banks are responsible for items in several instances under the U.C.C. de-
spite a showing of lack of actual knowledge. For example, in U.C.C. §§ 3-206(4) and 3-419 the
first taker, which is frequently the depositary bank, of an item that has been restrictively indorsed
must pay or apply any value consistently with the indorsement. The rule is objective and the
depositary bank's failure to take actual notice of the restrictive indorsement is no defense. Like-
wise, depositary banks are responsible for paying items over a forged indorsement under U.C.C.
§§ 3-419(l)(c) and 3-417(2). Almost all courts have held that the depositary bank is liable for
paying an instrument over a forged indorsement even though the literal language of U.C.C. § 3-
419(3) provides depositary banks with an exclusion from liability. Liability without negligence is
not uncommon in the U.C.C.
Payor banks are also liable without actual knowledge. For example, U.C.C. § 4-207(l)(b)
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H. The Criminal Law Problem
The courts in criminal cases have had to contend with the issue of
whether the drawer of a PDC has committed a crime when the PDC is
returned unpaid. Most states have a Worthless Checks Act which pro-
vides that anyone who willfully with intent to defraud makes, utters,
draws, or delivers to another a check or draft drawn on a bank"10 with-
out sufficient funds to cover the check or draft is guilty of a crime."'
Placing PDCs into the context of such statutes presents two problems.
The first problem deals with the mens rea. Do drawers of PDCs have
intent to defraud at the time the check is written? The second problem
is definitional. Is a PDC a check within the meaning of the statute?
1. Defining PDC for Criminal Law Purposes
In New York v. Gerber,'"2 the court felt it was necessary to deter-
mine if a PDC was a check, within the meaning of New York's worth-
less check statute"' which stated that "check" does not include any
sight order for the payment of money which is "postdated with respect
to the time of utterance.""" In Gerber, the defendant's attorney was
given three postdated checks, which were delivered on their respective
dates to the payee. The checks were not honored when they were
presented to the payor bank for payment. The case raised a novel ques-
tion of whether checks which were postdated at the time they were
written, but not delivered until their dates were current, were in fact
postdated checks. The court looked to the U.C.C. for assistance in de-
fining PDC and found none." 5 The court turned to case law and deter-
mined that there could be no postdating for criminal law purposes
places liability on the payor bank for a forged drawer's signature. Ostensibly such liability, com-
monly referred to as the rule of Price v. Neal, is based upon the payor bank's failure to compare
the drawer's signature with the signature card. See Florence P. Berkley, Note, Computerized
Check Processing and a Bank's Duty to Use Ordinary Care, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1173 (1987).
110. This is an obvious redundancy since drafts drawn on banks are by definition checks.
Coincidentally, a PDC is a draft drawn on a bank that does not fall within the definition of a
check; so the drafter's redundancy may have included PDC, which technically would not have
been included if the legislation only said checks.
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-9-13.1 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.11 (Baldwin
1988).
112. 453 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1982).
113. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.05 (McKinney 1988).
114. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.00(1) (McKinney 1988). State penal codes frequently contain
a definition that excludes postdated checks.
115. 453 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1000.
[Vol. 14:37
POSTDATED CHECKS
without notice of the same." 6 Since the payees in the case had notice
of the postdating, the court treated the PDCs as checks and found the
defendant guilty under the statute.
117
The opinion of the court is correct to the extent that it used the
definitions in the statute and case law to include the checks within the
definition of check for purposes of the statute. However, it is inappro-
priate to conclude that the defendant willfully issued the checks with
intent to defraud the payees without a further inquiry into the defend-
ant's state of mind at the time. The United States criminal justice sys-
tem is founded on principles which penalize individuals who act with
the prescribed level of criminal intent or mens rea. A conviction which
is not based upon whether the payee had notice of the postdating runs
contrary to those principles. It is conceivable that lack of notice and
lack of criminal intent could peacefully coexist under the circumstances
presented in Gerber.118
2. Criminal Intent
In order to be found guilty under a worthless check statute, the
defendant must have written the checks with an intent to defraud the
payee. The payee is defrauded because the payee thinks that there is
money in the account to cover the check (and usually gives the defend-
ant something of value based upon that belief) when in fact there is
none. The payee of a PDC knows when the check is accepted that there
are currently insufficient funds in the account to cover the check and
that there might still be insufficient funds in the account on the future
date which appears on the check.119 That knowledge precludes the
payee from being defrauded. The postdating of the check is sufficient to
give the payee notice that there are no funds and there may never be
116. Id. at 1001. The court looked to the time of utterance to determine if a check is
postdated. The statute defined utterance as the time the check is delivered to the person who
acquires a right against the drawer with respect to such a check. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.00(4)
(McKinney 1988).
117. 453 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
118. The defendant for example, could have written the checks and given them to his attor-
ney anticipating having the money in the bank at the time the checks came due and as a result of
circumstances, unforeseen at the time he wrote the checks, did not have the money. The defendant
would thereby lack the criminal intent while the payees lacked notice of the postdating.
119. Gerber, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 1002. Anderson v. Bryson, 115 So. 505 (Fla. 1925); People v.
Kubitz, 235 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1963); People v. Kapitovsky, 258 N.Y.S. 861 (1932); Ohio v.




any.12 The result is that the person who takes a PDC takes at his own
risk and the criminal law will provide no more protection than it does
for any other bad debt. One court very aptly said:
One who knowingly takes a postdated check . . . and exchanges an
article of value therefor, makes the exchange not upon his faith that
the drawer has at the time sufficient funds to meet the check, but
upon his willingness to risk the ability of the drawer to make a deposit
and to have in bank, on or after the date mentioned in the check,
sufficient funds with which to comply with the obligation. 2 '
III. THE REVISED U.C.C. ARTICLES 3 AND 4 AND POSTDATED
CHECKS
A. Definition of Postdated Check in the Revised U.C.C. Articles 3
and 4
The revised U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4122 have specific provisions for
PDCs; however, there is no definition for PDC and the reader is re-
quired to dovetail several sections in order to determine that a PDC is
included in the definition of "check." Revised U.C.C. § 3-104(f) de-
fines check as follows:
"Check" means (i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable
on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier's check or teller's
check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on
its face by another term such as money order.
This definition, standing alone, suggests that the drafters of the revised
Articles 3 and 4 have again decided to leave a longstanding ambiguity
in the law: checks are payable on demand, but PDCs are payable after
their stated date, therefore PDCs are not checks. Although PDCs have
not been classified as instruments "payable on demand" as that term
has been defined in the past, a new definition of payable on demand
could include PDCs, which are payable on demand after the date of the
instrument. That appears to be the intent of the drafters. Revised
120. "Likewise, a postdated check, in the absence of a present representation that the check
is good, carries on its face implied notice that the maker does not presently have sufficient funds
on deposit to pay the check." People v. Meller, 524 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Colo. 1974). See also
Matter of Griffin, 83 Cal. App. 779 (1927); Highsmith v. State, 38 Ga. App. 192 (1928); Turner
v. Brenner, 138 Va. 232 (1924); State v. Carr, 294 P. 1016 (Wash. 1930).
121. Neidlinger v. State, 88 S.E. 687, 688 (Ga. Ct. App. 1916).
122. See Final Draft, supra note 37.
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U.C.C. § 3-108(a) defines "payable on demand" as:
A promise or order is "payable on demand" if (i) it states that it is
payable on demand or at sight, or otherwise indicates that it is paya-
ble at the will of the holder, or (ii) it does not state any time of
payment.
Typically checks or PDCs do not state that they are payable on de-
mand; however, it is rational to argue that checks are implicitly paya-
ble at the will of the holder. 123 In other words, since checks, by their
very nature, are payable at the will of the holder, when the drawer
decides to issue a check that characteristic is accepted. Postdating the
check does not refute that implication since PDCs are payable at the
will of the holder just like an ordinary check. The holder of a PDC
must present the check for payment, and therefore, it is irrefutably
payable at the will of the holder. The only qualification is that the
holder's "will" should not be exercised until after the stated date.
That this was the intent of the drafters is confirmed by revised
U.C.C. § 3-113(a) which states:
An instrument may be antedated or postdated. The date stated deter-
mines the time for payment if the instrument is payable at a fixed
period after date. Except as provided in § 4-401(3), an instrument
payable on demand is not payable before the date of the instrument.
The last sentence specifically provides for a postdated instrument paya-
ble on demand."2 4 The drafters anticipated that an instrument could be
both postdated and payable on demand as the latter term is defined in
revised U.C.C. § 3-108(a).
123. Checks are payable at the will of the holder because checks must be presented in order
to receive payment. Without presentment there is no right to obtain payment from the drawee or
from secondary parties unless presentment is excused. U.C.C. § 3-501(1)(c) requires presentment
for payment in order to charge any drawer or indorser. Since a holder has the power to decide
whether or not to present the item for payment it is clear that checks are payable at the will of the
holder. The provisions in U.C.C. § 3-501(l)(c) are found by dovetailing revised U.C.C. § 3-
501(a), which defines presentment, revised U.C.C. § 3-502(b)(1), which defines dishonor of a
check, and revised U.C.C. § 3-414(a), which imposes liability on the drawer in the event of
dishonor.
124. The drafters provide that postdated instruments are not payable before the date of the
instrument. The exception in new § 4-401 requires bank customers to give notice to the bank of
the postdating of a check. Failure to do so relieves the bank of any responsibility for paying a
check prior to the date of the instrument. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. Current
U.C.C. § 3-114(2), supra note 23, like new § 3-113, also makes provisions for an instrument that
is payable on demand and postdated. This language created an ambiguity because there is nothing
in the current U.C.C. which makes it clear that PDCs are payable on demand.
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Undoubtedly, these new provisions take PDCs out of the defini-
tional limboland they have resided in for the past few centuries. The
argument that the definition of PDC has been ambiguous long enough
to deserve specific reference in the new Articles 3 and 4 has merit: a
simple statement included in the definition of checks, much the same as
the specific reference to money orders, cashier's checks, and teller's
checks would be appropriate. 23 Others, including the writer, will be
content that the revised code, particularly § 3-113(a), clears up a long-
standing area of ambiguity in a straightforward manner that does not
take a rocket scientist to figure out.126 Whatever the drafters' reasons
were for not embellishing PDCs with space in the definition section,
that omission may parallel the disposition of bankers and commercial
lawyers about PDCs. PDCs create big problems for bankers, whose
electronic processing systems do not spot postdated checks. Rather than
dignify PDCs with a definition, many bankers would probably prefer to
eliminate PDCs and have all checks mature on date of issue.
127
B. The Revised U.C.C. Article 4 and the Section 4-401 Notice
Provision
The current U.C.C. Article 4 was written with a primary focus on
the interests of bankers, 28 which created some controversy at the time
that it was adopted.'2 9 The revised U.C.C. Article 4 maintains the
125. The classification of the three named items have suffered a much shorter history of
problems than PDCs.
126. The revised U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 make specific reference to PDCs in the comment
to U.C.C. § 3-113 which mentions PDCs while explaining that section's relationship to § 4-401 (c).
Revised U.C.C. § 4-401 refers to PDCs in its text.
127. That is what the court decided in the MaGill case, despite longstanding widely ac-
cepted legal principles to the contrary. MaGill, 6 Q.L.J. 262 (Austl. 1895). Although there is
little legal precedence for making all checks payable from date of issue, given the current state of
technology, practical reasons for doing so abound. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
Many-lawyers regard PDCs as a poor substitute for other instruments that are more suitable
to achieve a desired result. PDCs are often used instead of promissory notes, bills of exchange, or
as credit devices. Frequently, the use of PDCs creates problems that may have been avoided if an
instrument had been chosen that was more appropriate for the transaction. As much as lawyers
and bankers may desire for PDCs to "go away," they are very much a part of modern day com-
merce and have been employed in some surprisingly creative circumstances. See description of
various uses of PDCs, supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
128. Edward L. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of
the U.C.C., 43 Bus. LAw 621, 626 (1988) ("It is no secret that article 4 was drafted primarily by
bank attorneys and views the world through banker's eyes.").
129. See Fred Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952).
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same orientation."'0 Professor Edward L. Rubin described the basic
goals of the U.C.C. revisions:
The first goal is to modernize the U.C.C. rules and make them consis-
tent with current technological developments. The second is to clarify
or correct those provisions that have caused interpretive difficulties for
the courts. 81
The dichotomy between the U.C.C. rules governing PDCs and the
technology used to process checks create a classic example of the kinds
of issues that the revisions were intended to address. The problems with
postdated checks could have been addressed from several different an-
gles. For example, the drafters could have: 1) left the existing law in-
tact; 2) required that the bankers MICR encode the date on each
check and pay them in accordance with the stated date; 3) prohibited
the use of PDCs; or 4) required that drawers give their banks notice
that the drawers have issued PDCs.
The drafters could not leave the existing law in tact without falling
short of their goals. Inconsistency between prevailing technology and
the current rules is the source of the problems that bankers and their
customers have with PDCs. The check processing technology employed
by bankers does not include the MICR encoding of the date of the
check, but the current U.C.C. rules presume that bankers are aware of
all information on checks, including the dates. Nor could the drafters
presume, if existing rules were not changed, that bankers would volun-
tarily adopt technology that included MICR encoding of the date on
checks. Even though bankers could avoid exposure to liability for pre-
mature payment of PDCs by encoding the date, bankers have suffered
with the exposure to such liability for years and have not responded
with changes in technology.
The drafters probably had the same rationale as the bankers for
not selecting the second option: it is too expensive. Relatively few PDCs
are issued when compared to the total number of checks processed
daily. Bankers argue that PDCs represent such a small proportion of
the total number of checks that incurring the cost of the new technol-
ogy necessary to MICR encode the dates on checks is not justified.
130. Rubin, supra note 128, at 627. Rubin states, "This basic orientation [of articles 3 and
4] toward banks has become increasingly controversial .... The revision embodies essentially the
same choice; it preserves the basic distribution of losses between consumers and the banks, avoids
creating any new consumer rights, and retains the power of the banks to vary the UCC terms by
agreement, including agreements among themselves that are then binding on the customers." Id.
131. Rubin, supra note 128, at 628.
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Furthermore, encoding the date would slow the check processing sys-
tem down by the time required to place the date on each check. Even
though it might only take a few seconds per check, cumulatively the
time required to encode the dates on checks would result in a signifi-
cant slowdown in check processing.
Prohibiting the issuance of PDCs is a drastic change from existing
law and would probably be considered too offensive to the interests of
customers. Alternative four placed the burden of identifying PDCs on
the customer, without depriving the customer of the right to issue
PDCs. The new provision found in revised U.C.C. § 4-401 requires that
customers give their bankers notice that PDCs have been issued, other-
wise the PDCs are properly payable. The revised § 4-401(c) provides:
When Bank May Charge Customer's Account
(C) A bank may charge against the account of a customer a check
that is otherwise properly payable from the account, even though pay-
ment was made prior to the date of the check, unless the customer has
given notice to the bank of the postdating describing the check with
reasonable certainty. The notice will be effective for the period stated
in § 4-403(b) for stop orders, and must be received at such time and
in such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act
on it before any action by the bank with respect to the check de-
scribed in § 4-303. If a bank charges against the account of customer
a check before the date stated in the notice of postdating, the bank is
liable for damages for the loss resulting from its act. The loss may
include damages for dishonor of subsequent items pursuant to § 4-
402.182
This provision gives drawers of PDCs essentially the same treat-
ment as customers who wish to stop payment on a check. In order for a
stop-payment order to be effective, the drawer must notify the payor
bank in time for the bank to stop payment. 138 Oral notice is good for
fourteen days after which the order must be confirmed in writing.1
34
Mechanically, the process employed by the bank to execute a stop-pay-
132. See Final Draft, supra note 37.
133. U.C.C. §§ 4-403 and 4-303, supra note 44.
134. Revised U.C.C. § 4-303(b) provides:
A stop payment order is effective for six months, but it lapses after 14 calendar days if
the original order was oral and was not confirmed in writing within that period. A stop
payment order may be renewed for additional six month periods by a writing given to
the bank within a period during which the stop payment order is effective.




ment order or notice of postdating is similar. The payor bank inputs a
description of the check into its electronic payment system, which iden-
tifies the check and causes payment to be denied. 138 For stop-payments
timely notification is a prerequisite to the bank's responsibility for the
check. Likewise under the new provision, the payor bank is not respon-
sible for untimely payment of PDCs unless the bank has received
timely notice. In essence, under the new section, PDCs are properly
payable at the time they are presented without regard to the stated
date, unless the bank has a notice of postdating. Although this provi-
sion is new to the U.C.C., it is not novel. Four states currently have
laws which similarly predicate the bank's liability for premature pay-
ment of PDCs on the timely receipt of a notice of postdating from the
customer."3 6 The state legislatures in Kansas, Florida, Alabama, and
Utah have adopted special provisions in their banking law statutes that
require written notice.
C. Reasons Why the Drawer Should Be Required to Give Notice
The Federal Reserve System provides payment services for the
banking system." 7 In 1987 the U.S. Congress passed the Expedited
Funds Availability Act (EFAA) to decrease the time between deposit
of check and availability of funds for use by the depositor. 13 8 In order
to make funds available to the customer faster, checks must be paid as
quickly as possible. The drafters of the revised U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4
observed the mandate of the newly adopted EFAA. One of their objec-
tives was to accommodate an expedited payment system designed to get
checks paid fast and eliminate delays and float.' 3 9 With that in mind,
135. Sometime after the electronic process is completed, the actual paper instrument is de-
livered to the bank and the check will be stamped to indicate that payment has been stopped and
returned to the payee. For a description of the automated forward presentment process currently
used by the banking system, see Miller, Ballen, Davenport & Vergari, Commercial Paper, Bank
Deposits and Collections, and Commercial Electronic Fund Transfers, 42 Bus. LAW. 1269 (1986-
87) [hereinafter Miller].
136. See CLARK, supra note 10, at 2-17. "If a check is postdated, the bank will be liable for
paying it before its appointed time. With this exposure in mind, bankers have obtained special
statues in some states that require written notice of a PDC; in the absence of such notice given by
the drawer, the bank cannot be held liable for wrongful payment." Id.
137. See Miller, supra note 135, at 1270. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 43, Ch.
6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
138. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. sections 248a, 4001-
4010) (1987).
139. Electronic Processing System read and sorted checks at a rate of up to 120,000 checks
per hour in 1984. See Weshler, Delayed Funds Availability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117, 1129
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the drafters of the revised code had to reconsider those provisions of the
current U.C.C. which: 1) were insensitive to electronic processing sys-
tems, and 2) slowed down the payment of a check. PDCs are guilty on
both ends. The current code treatment of PDCs places liability on the
payor bank for premature payment, apparently presuming that the
payor bank examines the check prior to making the payment deci-
sion.'4 The electronic payment system is not designed to consider the
date on a check, and modification of the system would slow down the
payment of all checks."'
Rather than revise the electronic processing system to accommo-
date PDCs, the drafters revised the rules relative to PDCs to accommo-
date the system. Any drawer who desires to employ the system in an
extraordinary transaction, like postdating a check or stopping payment
on a check, has to notify the bank of that intention. This places the
burden of identifying the extraordinary transaction on the drawer and
relieves the industry of the necessity of taking time-consuming and
costly steps to avoid exposure to liability.'42
Placing the burden on the drawer has some semblance of propri-
ety. Drawers of PDCs use them to carry out personal objectives that
are foreign to the normal function of a check. When a check is used as
an extension of credit, debt collection device, will, or otherwise," 3 it is
endowed with special characteristics, reflective of the underlying trans-
action. The benefit of the special characteristics flow to the drawer
and/or the payee. It follows that one or both of those parties should
share in the burden."4 That the revised U.C.C. places the burden upon
the drawer rather than the payee may be a matter of practicality; the
(1984). The draft of current U.C.C. was completed 5 years before the American Bankers Associa-
tion Technical Subcommittee on Mechanization of Check Handling recommended a computerized
check handling system. See generally, ALDOM, PURDY, SCHNEIDER & WHITTINGHAM, AUTOMA-
TION IN BANKING (1963) [hereinafter ALDOM & PURDY].
140. See supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
141. Every time an additional item is added to the list of items that a check handler must
look for or encode on the MICR line additional time is required, which slows down the collection
process.
142. It is obvious at this late date that the industry did not deem it economically efficient to
modify the collection system in order to avoid exposure to liability for premature payment of
PDCs. The electronic payment system has been in place for 35 years and no steps have been taken
to accommodate PDCs.
143. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
144. The burden is truly only a shared burden. The payor bank must still take measures to
identify the check and make certain that it is not prematurely paid. The payor bank also assumes
liability on the check if it is paid after the bank receives notice of the postdating.
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drawer has the relationship with the payor bank.
A further reason for requiring drawers to give notice to the bank is
that it is less costly for drawers to give notice than it is for the banking
industry to make changes to accommodate PDCs. If the drawer notifies
the bank of a PDC, the cost may be no greater than that of a phone
call, or the paper envelope, and stamp used to send the written notice,
or a trip to the bank, and the time involved in performing either task.
If the burden of identifying PDCs were assumed by the banking indus-
try, each check sent through the process would have to be inspected for
a date. Bankers would then have to decide what to do with PDCs after
they have taken the time to identify them. The check would either have
to be sorted out for hand processing or encoded with the date. If the
industry chose to encode the date, it is possible that every check would
have to have the date encoded and the system designed not to pay those
checks which are postdated. It does not make a whole lot of sense to
have the industry inspect every single check for the date in order to
catch the one check in one hundred thousand145 or so that is postdated.
Drawers will have to act expeditiously in order to avoid premature
payment of PDCs. The new notice requirement may result in a race to
the bank between the drawer and the payee. If the payee beats the
drawer to the bank and presents the PDC for payment, the drawer
loses. Conceivably, a drawer could issue a PDC at 1:00 p.m. on a bank-
ing day, notify the bank at 1:30 p.m. and still suffer loss if the check is
presented between 1:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. Any time gap between issu-
ance and notification to the bank could result in premature payment. In
order to insure that premature payment is not made, the drawer will
have to give the bank notice prior to or simultaneously with the issu-
ance of the PDC. 1' 6 Thus, the notice rule encourages the drawer to give
the bank prompt notice of postdating.
D. Should Written Notice Be Required by the U.C.C.?
All of the provisions on PDCs adopted by states prior to the revi-
sions to Articles 3 and 4 require that the customer give the bank writ-
ten notice of postdating. In 1975 the banking lobby in Kansas was in-
strumental in having a notice provision included in U.C.C. § 4-401.141
145. The figure is hypothetical and is not statistically derived.
146. The written notice requirement may prove less burdensome to drawer's as modern
technological innovations like fax machines become more accessible. A written notice could be
faxed to a bank in no less time than it would take to make a telephone call and give oral notice.
147. KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 84-4-401(3) (Vernon 1983) provides:
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The notice provision is the only nonuniform provision included in Arti-
cle 4 of the Kansas U.C.C., 148 and was adopted in part, according to
the legislative commentators, because PDCs are "offbeat" items and
bankers deserve written notice, sufficient to identify the check, that the
check will be presented. 149 Under the statute the drawer must notify
the bank of the date, number, amount of the check, and the name of
the payee.
The Florida and Utah statutes require written notice of postdating
as a prerequisite to payor liability; 1 0 however, unlike the Kansas stat-
ute, the Florida and Utah notice provisions are found in statutes regu-
lating financial institutions. The Florida statute was initially adopted in
1953, and thus predated that state's adoption of the U.C.C. 61 The
No bank shall be liable for charging against its customers account a postdated check,
otherwise properly payable from such account, before the date stated thereon unless the
customer has given written notice to the bank that the check is postdated. Such notice
shall include the name of the payee, the date, the number and the amount of such
check.
The official comment to subsection 4-401(3) provides:
Subsection 3 is a non-uniform provision added by the Kansas legislature in 1975 at the
behest of the Kansas Banker's Association. It is the only non-uniform provision in Arti-
cle 4 of the Kansas U.C.C. It is intended to give drawee banks protection against
postdated checks. If the drawer wants to make the postdating stick, he must give writ-
ten notice to the bank that such a check is on the way. Otherwise the check is "properly
payable" even though paid before the later date. The theory behind the amendment is
that post-dated checks are unusual items, they run contrary to commercial expectations,
and it is not unfair to require the customer to give some prior notice to the bank that
the offbeat item will be presented.
148. See comment to KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 84-4-401 (Vernon 1983).
149. Id.
150. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.64 (formerly § 659.36)(West 1984) provides as follows:
Issuance of post-dated checks: It shall be the duty of the person drawing a post-dated
check to notify, in writing, the bank upon which such check is drawn, giving a complete
description thereof, including the name of the payee, the date, the number and the
amount thereof, otherwise the bank or trust company shall not be liable for paying such
a check.
The language of previous, repealed versions of the statute used the adverb "erroneously" before
"paying."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-616 (1988) provides as follows:
Authority to accept transaction accounts
(5) It is the duty of the person drawing a post-dated check, draft or other negotiable or
transferable instrument, to notify, in writing, the branch of the financial institution
upon which the check, draft, or other negotiable or transferable instrument is drawn,
giving a complete description of the instrument, otherwise, the financial institution is
not liable for erroneously paying the check, draft or other negotiable or transferable
instrument before the date it bears.
151. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 247 (West .1980) (Historical Note). In Florida, the courts have
had an opportunity to interpret and apply its statute in Florida Nat'l Bank v. Dental, 210 So. 2d
1991] POSTDATED CHECKS
Utah notice provision was not adopted until 1981,152 long after that
state adopted the U.C.C.
The notice provision in Alabama predicates liability of the bank
for paying a check prior to its date on the drawer's failure to write
"POSTDATED" across the face of the check.153 The statutory com-
ments indicate that placing such a legend on the check was common
practice in Alabama. "This section ... is intended to protect bank
customers by making postdating of a check effective as understood by
the public. 1 54 The drafters of the revised U.C.C. have taken a strong
position against any writings on a check that are out of the ordinary.155
241 (Fla. 1968). The plaintiff had issued a PDC dated December 13, 1963 for $10,000 drawn on
defendant's bank. The check was paid on December 12. When the bank opened on the morning of
December 13, plaintiff gave the bank an oral stop-payment order. The court held that the statute
precluded any liability on the part of the bank, although the check was paid prior to the stated
date, when the plaintiff failed to give the bank written notice prior to the time that the check was
paid. Id.
152. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-616 (1988) (History).
153. ALA. CODE § 5-5A-34 (1980) provides:
Payment of postdated checks. Whenever a postdated check is drawn upon any bank, the
bank upon which the check is drawn, shall not be liable to the drawer of said check
because of paying the check prior to the date thereof, unless there appears written
across the face of the check in bold type or writing the word "POSTDATED."
The provision was included in a major revision and modernization of the Alabama Banking
Code in 1980. The notice provision was not new and had been included in the banking code that
preceded the 1980 revisions.
154. ALA. CODE, Comment to § 5-5A-34 (1980). This language could also mean that the
public expected the bank to pay a PDC on the stated date and the statute continued that practice.
Arguably, such a legend could help to solve some of the problems with PDCs experienced by
bankers as a result of the electronic payment system. In the ordinary case, the only person that
scrutinizes the check after it enters the forward collection process is the first person who handles
it. That person could be a teller or employee at a bank where the check is presented for payment
or deposit, or the clerk in the lockbox operation who electronically encodes the check with the
amount and the code number of the depositary bank on the MICR line. This information is then
mechanically read. The decision of whether to pay an item is made electronically, based upon the
amount of the check and the balance in the customer's account.
155. See Rubin, supra note 128, at 662. In a draft as late as September 1979, a new § 4-
110 was included that provided as follows:
Information on a check that may be disregarded except as otherwise provided within
this [ACT], a bank in paying, purchasing, or taking a check for collection, may disre-
gard information on the check other than the signature of the drawer, the identification
of the drawee and payee, the amount, information encoded on the check in machine
readable form pursuant to banking industry standards and indorsements. Except as pro-
vided in § 4-404, a payor bank may also disregard the date unless the drawer has given
notice of postdating pursuant to § 4-401(3).
Id.
This provision was intended to facilitate check truncation and electronic check processing,
however, it was edited out of the Proposed Final Draft and a provision more specifically address-
ing truncation was included in the draft.
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That principle is what gave rise to the notice provision for PDCs. Bank-
ers argue that handwritten, as opposed to electronically encoded,
messages or irregularities such as postdatings, on checks are incompati-
ble with the high speed electronic check processing currently employed
in the banking system, 16  and that the cost of identifying checks con-
taining handwritten messages is prohibitive.6 7
The oral notice provision in the revised U.C.C. is less favorable to
bankers in Kansas, Utah, and Florida than their current law. 158 One
could predict that the bankers in those states, particularly in Kansas
and Utah where the legislation creating the written notice requirement
is more recent, will be hesitant to have the written notice requirement
replaced with an oral one. A strong lobby to maintain the status quo
could lead to nonuniformity in the U.C.C. in those states, and other
state legislatures might be encouraged to follow their lead. Standing
alone that threat does not provide persuasive support for a written no-
tice requirement. Written notice is burdensome to customers, without
offsetting increases in benefit to the banks. Bankers already have the
facilities for accepting oral orders of stop-payments on checks and the
same procedures can be employed for notices of postdating. Whether
oral or written, the notice provision will require that the drawer beat
the payee to the bank; otherwise the PDC is properly payable. Written
notice just makes it more difficult for the drawer to win the race, since
oral notice can usually be effected faster than written notice.
E. Can Banks Contractually Prohibit Customers From Postdating
Checks?
Courts have determined that customers can stop payment and that
right cannot be taken away by contract.6 9 U.C.C. § 4-403(2) states
156. See Rubin, supra note 128, at 663.
157. See ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, THE EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE (Comment to U.C.C. § 4-110, Supplement Sept. 7-9, 1989).
158. The oral notice provision in the revised U.C.C. is more favorable to bankers in Ala-
bama than their current legend provision. Lobbyists for consumers will be more likely to complain
than bankers.
159. U.C.C. § 4-103, supra note 77, precludes the bank from varying the U.C.C. in such a
way that disclaims the bank's responsibility to exercise ordinary care. Case law has supported the
position that although banks can vary § 4-403 by agreement, the bank cannot eliminate the cus-
tomer's right to stop payment. See generally McLaughlin v. Franklin Soc. Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969); Richardson Heights Bank and Trust v.
Wertz, 482 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). However, the District of Columbia statute re-
quires that a stop-payment order be in writing specifically describing the item to which it relates
by stating the amount, date, and payee thereof; the court allowed the bank to waive that provision
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that "An oral order is binding upon the bank only for fourteen calendar
days unless confirmed in writing within that period." The comments to
the U.C.C. describe stopping payment as a "service which depositors
expect and are entitled to receive from the bank notwithstanding its
difficulty, inconvenience, and expense." 160 It would not be an overstate-
ment to say that stop payment is a legal "right" which accrues to the
benefit of the drawer. There is a general sense that customers should
have a right to stop payment on checks and that banks should bear the
burden and occasional losses that result from foul ups. 161
The practice of postdating a check could be described as a right,
similar to the right to stop payment on a check, because the U.C.C.
makes specific provisions for PDCs just as it does for stop-payment or-
ders. That is where the similarity ends. PDCs do not share the elevated
status of stop-payment orders. Many lawyers think of PDCs as a poor
substitute for something better. 6 ' Undoubtedly bankers, who were
heavily involved in the drafting of the revised U.C.C., would not find it
desirable to place PDCs on the same "pedestal" as stop-payment or-
ders. However, the revised U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 provide treatment
of PDCs that is analogous to the treatment given stop-payment orders.
Since the notice requirements, timeliness of notice, and liability of the
bank for failure to follow the customer's instructions in the notice are
the same for PDCs and stop-payment orders, the logical mind does not
have to be stretched far to reason that the customer's right to issue
PDCs should be afforded the same legal protection as the customer's
right to stop payment.
The treatment of PDCs in the revised U.C.C. should be evaluated
in light of the status given PDCs prior to the revisions. As discussed in
Part II of this article, 6 s the enforceability of contract provisions limit-
ing the customer's right to issue PDCs is dependent upon whether the
banks are contracting away their obligation to act in good faith and
exercise ordinary care. 64 Given the current definition of ordinary care
requiring a writing in the customer contract. Rimberg v. Union Trust Co. of D.C., 12 U.C.C. REP.
SRv. 527 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
160. Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 4-103.
161. See the official comment 2 to § 4-403 which states: "The position taken by this section
is that stopping payment is a service which depositors expect and are entitled to receive from
banks notwithstanding its difficulty, inconvenience and expense. The inevitable occasional losses
through failure to stop should be borne by the banks as a cost of the business of banking."
162. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
164. U.C.C. § 4-103.
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in U.C.C. § 4-103, a good case can be made for limiting the bank's
ability to limit the customer's right to postdate checks by contract.
That conclusion is based upon the broad definition of ordinary care and
good faith in the current U.C.C. The drafters of the revised U.C.C.
Articles 3 and 4 included the following definition of ordinary care in
revised U.C.C. § 3-103(7):
"Ordinary care" in the case of a person engaged in business means
observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area
in which that person is located, with respect to the business in which
that person is engaged. In the case of a bank that takes an instrument
for processing for collection or payment by automated means, reason-
able commercial standards do not require the bank to examine the
instrument if the failure to examine does not violate the bank's pre-
scribed procedures and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasona-
bly from general banking usage not disapproved by this Article or
Article 4.165
This narrow definition of ordinary care relieves banks of the duty to
examine instruments for a date if other banks in the area in which the
bank is located do not. Since the technological processes which do not
include examining checks for dates or MICR encoding the date on the
check are industry wide, banks can observe reasonable commercial
standards and exercise ordinary care even though the banks fail to de-
tect PDCs. This definition of ordinary care would give the banks the go
ahead to include provisions in their contracts limiting the customers'
rights to postdate checks, without disclaiming any responsibility for the
banks' lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care. Given the
very narrow definition of ordinary care in revised U.C.C. § 3-103(7),166
it is likely that contract provisions limiting the customers' right to issue
PDCs will not violate revised U.C.C. § 4-103.167
165. See Final Draft, supra note 37. In addition to U.C.C. § 4-103(1), this definition of
ordinary care affects the bank's liability under U.C.C. § 3-406, Negligence Contributing to Alter-
ation or Unauthorized Signature, and U.C.C. § 4-406, Customer's Duty to Discover and Report
Unauthorized Signature or Alteration.
166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
167. The revised U.C.C. § 4-103(a) provides:
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement but the parties
to the agreement cannot disclaim a bank's responsibility for its lack of good faith or
failure to exercise ordinary care or limit the measure of damages for the lack or failure.
However, the parties may determine by agreement the standards by which the bank's
responsibility is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
This section is essentially the same as U.C.C. § 4-103 (1977). All of the changes can
best be described as stylistic.
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F. Can Banks Require Written Notice?
The best argument that the banks are precluded from requiring
written notice of PDCs is that PDCs should be treated like stop-pay-
ment orders, and customers have a longstanding legally recognized
right in U.C.C. § 4-403(2) to give oral orders for stop-payment which
are good for fourteen days.168 The banks have a very good counterargu-
ment that PDCs are not stop-payment orders and there is no reason to
afford them the same treatment. The revised U.C.C. provisions for
stop-payment orders do not explicitly state that oral stop-payment or-
ders are binding for fourteen calendar days. Revised U.C.C. § 4-403(b)
states: "A stop payment order is effective for six months, but lapses
after 14 calendar days if the original order was oral and was not con-
firmed in writing within that period." This language falls far short of
the mandate in current U.C.C. § 4-403(2). Without the statutory lan-
guage mandating that oral stop-payment orders are binding, banks
should be able to require written stop-payment orders by contract with
their customers. Contract provisions requiring that stop-payment orders
be written will have to fall within the limitations established by revised
U.C.C. § 4-103 and not disclaim the bank's responsibility to exercise
good faith and ordinary care, but I see no reason why that provision
should limit the banks' ability to require written notice. If the revised
U.C.C. allows banks to require written stop-payment orders, the argu-
ment that PDCs should receive the same treatment as stop-payment
orders leads to the conclusion that written notice can be required for
postdating notices.
There is nothing in the language of revised U.C.C. § 4-401(b) that
would limit the banks' ability to also contractually require customers to
give written notice of postdating. Contract provisions requiring written
postdating notices would not fail because of the good faith and ordinary
care limitations in revised U.C.C. § 4-103. As discussed above those
limitations are narrow enough to allow the banks to preclude customers
from issuing PDCs, so it follows that banks should also be able to re-
quire written notice without offense to that provision.
G. Who is Liable for Early Payment of Postdated Checks?
In the revised U.C.C. the payor bank is not liable for premature
168. U.C.C. § 4-403(2) provides: "An oral order is binding upon the bank only for fourteen
calendar days unless confirmed in writing within that period."
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payment of PDCs in the absence of timely notice from the drawer.
Does that mean that the drawer who fails to give timely notice is left
holding the bag-all of the losses that could result from the nonper-
formance of the payee or dishonor of checks resulting from depletion of
the account? 6" The revised U.C.C. § 4-401 defines the lines of liability
between the drawer and the payor bank, but does not address the ulti-
mate responsibility for *any losses resulting from premature payment.
The obvious alternatives are the depositary bank, the payee, or indor-
sers. Since there is no provision in the U.C.C. which could be relied
upon by the drawer to place liability on these parties, the drawer would
have to sue in tort for the negligent handling of the check or for breach
of contract.
1. Case for Liability of the Depositary Bank
The depositary bank has not contracted with the drawer to present
the PDC on a particular date, so an action would have to be based
upon the negligence of the bank in presenting the PDC prior to its
date. If we suppose that the drafters of the revised U.C.C. limited the
liability of the payor bank because it is irrational to hold the payor
bank responsible for premature payment when it does not have the op-
portunity to inspect the check and therefore could not have failed to
use ordinary care,"'0 it stands to reason that a party that does have the
opportunity to inspect should not similarly be excluded from liability.
The depositary bank handles the check and has an opportunity to check
the date. Failure to do so could constitute failure to exercise ordinary
care 171 and thereby justify the placement of liability on the depositary
bank. For the typical, day to day, over-the-counter transaction, in
which a depositor presents a check to a teller with a deposit slip, it does
not seem overly burdensome to require the teller to inspect the check
for a date and refuse to accept it for deposit if the check is postdated.
In such cases the depositary bank is negligent for failing to notice the
date and should be liable to the drawer.
There are a number of transactions handled by depositary banks
that do not follow the typical over-the-counter pattern; corporate cus-
tomers, for example, send thousands of checks at a time to the deposi-
169. See supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
171. The definition of ordinary care in the revised U.C.C. § 3-103, supra note 165, suggests
that the bank's failure to examine may not constitute failure to exercise ordinary care.
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tary bank which must be processed for deposit. The burden on the
teller/processor to inspect each check for the date is considerable. 17 1 It
may be difficult to demonstrate that failure to inspect the check under
such circumstances constitutes negligence, 7 and the depositary bank
should not be liable to the drawer under those circumstances.
In many over-the-counter banking transactions, the payee presents
a PDC for payment or deposit to the payor bank. The payor bank is
also the depositary bank on those occasions, and in the former capacity
will enjoy the revised U.C.C. § 4-401 limitation on liability. If the
drawer has not given written notice to the payor bank, the payor/de-
positary bank will not be liable for premature payment of the check. If
drawers are allowed to prevail in tort actions against depositary banks
for losses due to the bank's negligence in prematurely sending PDCs
through the payment system for collection, the result will be that
payor/depositary banks will be free from liability for the same conduct
that depositary banks are held responsible.
2. Case for liability of the Payee
An action against the payee could be based upon the contract be-
tween the drawer and the payee. If the payee agreed to accept the
PDC, knowing that it was postdated and either explicitly or implicitly
agreed not to present the check for payment until the date on the
check, presentment of the check prematurely will be a breach of con-
tract. The following examples will be used to illustrate the possibilities:
Dan Drawer and Paul Payee agreed that Dan would pay for Paul's
lawnmower with a check dated two weeks after the purchase. Paul
deposited the check into his personal account the day after it was is-
sued and the check was promptly paid. Checks drawn on Dan's ac-
count start bouncing all over the place as a result of the depletion of
the account.
Since Dan and Paul had agreed to the delayed payment, it became a
part of their sales contract and Paul breached when he presented the
check for payment prior to the agreed upon date.
Diane Drawer issued and mailed a PDC payable to Veryfine Visa, to
make an installment payment on her Visa card. The credit card com-
172. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
173. It probably is not failure to use ordinary care, supra notes 148-54. It is unlikely that it
will satisfy the standard of negligence that would be applied in a case sounding in tort.
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pany had a lockbox operation 17 but the clerk did not look for nor
notice the date on the check, forwarded it through the collection pro-
cess and it was promptly paid. Diane's checks bounced all over the
place as a result of the depletion of the account.
In order for Veryfine Visa to be responsible for breach of contract, it
would be necessary to demonstrate that Veryfine agreed to delay pres-
entation of the check and breached that agreement. There was obvi-
ously no explicit agreement here since Veryfine did not know that the
check was postdated at the time it was forwarded for collection. Ac-
ceptance of the PDC as payment could be construed as an implicit ac-
ceptance of its terms, which of course includes the time of payment.
Although such implicit acceptance could establish the basis for breach
of contract, the better view is that it does not. Payees should be respon-
sible for breach of contract due to premature presentment of PDCs
only when it can be demonstrated that the payee knew of and agreed to
such terms. The drawer should not be allowed to lull unwary payees
into secret contract provisions and then hold the payee responsible for
damages that result from violation of the provisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The treatment of PDCs in the courts and by the legal system has
been fairly consistent, despite the fact that PDCs were nebulously de-
fined in the N.I.L. and the U.C.C. The revised U.C.C. includes a less
ambiguous definition; however, the reader still has to rely on more than
one section of the code to derive a working definition of a PDC. This is
a significant improvement over prior code treatment.
The revised U.C.C. imposes a notice requirement on the drawers
of PDCs. Under the revised law, payor banks will no longer be respon-
sible for failure to detect and refuse payment of PDCs prior to their
stated date, unless the drawer gives the bank written notice describing
the check before the check has been paid by the payor bank. The old
rule placing liability on the bank was not in tune with the realities of
current technology and ignored the fact that payor banks probably paid
PDCs prematurely even though they exercised ordinary care. The new
174. Lock box operations are used by payees who are institutions that handle a substantial
volume of checks. The payee sends checks daily to the processing facility where the check is
MICR encoded with the amount of the check and the depositary bank code. That information is
electronically transmitted to the payor bank. If there are sufficient funds in the drawer's account,
an electronic transfer is made from the drawer's account to the payee's account.
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rule places the responsibility for identifying PDCs on the drawer, who
has to beat the payee to the bank in order to prevent premature pay-
ment. Since banks already have established procedures for accepting
notices for stop-payment orders, PDCs can be accommodated without a
significant burden on the payor.
Although the notice provision may be more fair to bankers, it fails
to provide protection for consumers. Bankers are shielded from liability
for premature payment unless they receive notice, but bankers are not
required by the revised U.C.C. to advise their customers of the notice
requirement. Forseeably, unenlightened drawers will unwarily issue
PDCs and suffer the consequences, which will undoubtedly include re-
turned check charges from the payor bank, closed accounts, and
marred reputations with payees when checks are dishonored due to de-
pletion of the drawers' accounts.
The narrow definition of ordinary care in the revised U.C.C. will
make it easier for banks to vary the provisions of the U.C.C. in their
deposit contracts. It is very likely that banks will either prohibit their
customers from issuing PDCs or require that customers give the banks
written notice that a postdated check has been issued. Customers who
are made aware of such limitations in their contracts may be better off
than those who are not advised of the notice requirements and issue
PDCs expecting that banks will pay the checks on the stated dates.
The revised U.C.C. is silent on who is liable for losses resulting
from premature payment, which leaves room for injured drawers to sue
depositary banks or payees in contract or tort for the drawers' losses.
Depositary banks acting negligently, or payees who have contractually
agreed to present the PDC for payment on the stated date, may be
liable to the drawer for losses.
The revised U.C.C. and the new § 4-401 notice provision does not
resolve PDC problems that are so much a part of the current law. The
new law does shift the burden of premature payment of PDCs from the
banks to the drawers, and forces those drawers to look for new defend-
ants, like depositary banks and payees, when the drawers suffer losses
due to premature payment.
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